The over-optimism among experts in assessment and foresight

It is still disputed whether foresight exercises should be based on top-expert assessments or on a broader base of less specialised experts, and whether the self-rating of experts is an acceptable method. Using the German 1993 and the Austrian 1998 Technology Delphis, this study addresses both questions. Self-rating is, in fact, an appropriate method for selecting experts. But the assessment of self-rated top experts tend to suffer from an optimism bias due to the experts' involvement and their underestimation of realisation and diffusion problems. The degree of optimism is positively correlated with the degree of self-rated knowledge, and it is more pronounced for the least pioneering and for organizational innovations. Experts with top self-ratings working in business have a stronger optimism bias than those working in the academia or in the administration: Consistent with the insider hypothesis, they are most optimistic with regard to realisation, innovativeness, and potential leadership in economic exploitation. Given the optimism bias, foresight exercises should base their panels on a fair mixture of experts of different grades, with different types of knowledge and affiliation, and not only on top specialists of the respective field. Delphi-type exercises, therefore, offer an advantage relative to forum groups or small panels of specialists.     

The Cost of Monopoly in Australian Manufacturing

This article looks at the deadweight loss arising from monopoly elements in Australian manufacturing under various assumptions and its relationship with the level of concentration.     

Inflationsziel und Inflationsmessung in der Eurozone im Wandel

Wirtschaftsdienst - Viele Menschen im Euroraum haben zunehmend das Gefühl, dass der allgemeine Kaufkraftverlust des Geldes sehr viel höher ist als die offiziell gemessenen...     

Inter-temporal savings,current account trends and asymmetric shocks in a heterogeneous European Monetary Union

This paper contributes to the discussion on the European current account imbalances by analysing the intra-European trends since 1990 based on the theory of optimum currency areas. The authors show that German unification was the origin of not only the 1992–93 EMS crisis but also rising intra-European current account imbalances since 1999 that led to the European debt crisis. They argue that a reduced German current account surplus is in the interest of German taxpayers to contain financial risk, but that it would also impose austerity on the rest of Europe unless money supply expands even further.     

Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems

On-site examinations are regulators' primary tool for monitoring the financial condition of federally insured depository institutions. In this paper, we assess the speed with which the information content of the supervisory rating assigned during bank exams—the CAMEL rating—decays. This is an important issue because cost and regulatory burden considerations often cause CAMEL ratings to be assigned relatively infrequently. As a benchmark for information content, we use econometric forecasts of bank failures generated by applying a probit model to publicly available accounting data. When compared with all CAMEL ratings available at a given point in time, the econometric forecasts provide a more accurate indication of failure. Further analysis reveals that this overall finding reflects the tendency for a CAMEL rating's information content to deteriorate noticeably beginning in the second or third quarter after the rating initially was assigned.     

Reverse Causality in Global and Intra‐European Imbalances

The paper discusses global current account imbalances in the context of an asymmetric world monetary system. It identifies the USA and Germany as center countries with rising/high current account deficits (USA) and surpluses (Germany). These are matched by current account surpluses of countries stabilizing their exchange rates against the dollar (dollar periphery) and current account deficits of countries stabilizing their exchange rates against the euro or members of the euro area (euro periphery). The paper finds that changes of world current account positions are closely linked to the monetary policy decision patterns both in the centers and peripheries. Whereas in the centers current account positions are affected by monetary policies, in the peripheries exchange rate stabilization cum sterilization matters. In specific, monetary expansion in the USA as well as exchange rate stabilization and sterilization policies in the dollar periphery are found to have contributed to global imbalances.     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung