A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential Earnings Forecast Accuracy*

Abstract. This research re-examines whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts through a comparison of their annual earnings per share forecasts. The comparison of analyst forecast accuracy is made on both an ex post (within sample) and an ex ante (out of sample) basis. Early examinations of this issue by Richards (1976), Brown and Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien (1990), and Butler and Lang (1991) were ex post and suggest the absence of analysts who can provide relatively more accurate forecasts over multiple years. Contrary to the results of prior research and consistent with the belief in the popular press, we document that differences do exist in financial analysts' ex post forecast accuracy. We show that the previous studies failed to find differences in forecast accuracy due to inadequate (or no) control for differences in the recency of forecasts issued by the analysts. It has been well documented in the literature that forecast recency is positively related to forecast accuracy (Crichfield, Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O'Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Thus, failure to control for forecast recency may reduce the power of tests, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in forecast accuracy even if they do exist. In our analysis, we control for the differences in recency of analysts' forecasts using two different approaches. First, we use an estimated generalized least squares estimation procedure that captures the recency-induced effects in the residuals of the model. Second, we use a matched-pair design whereby we measure the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst by comparing his/her forecast error to the forecast error of another randomly selected analyst making forecasts for the same firm in the same year on or around the same date. Using both approaches, we find that differential forecast accuracy does exist amongst analysts, especially in samples with minimum forecast horizons of five and 60 trading days. We show that these differences are not attributable to differences in the forecast issuance frequency of the financial analysts. In sum, after controlling for firm, year, forecast recency, and forecast issuance frequency of individual analysts, the analyst effect persists. To validate our findings, we examine whether the differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts persist in holdout periods. Analysts were assigned a “superior” (“inferior”) status for a firm-year in the estimation sample using percentile rankings on the distribution of absolute forecast errors for that firm-year. We use estimation samples of one- to four-year duration, and consider two different definitions of analyst forecast superiority. Analysts were classified as firm-specific “superior” if they maintained a “superior” status in every year of the estimation sample. Furthermore, they were classified as industry-specific “superior” if they were deemed firm-specific “superior” with respect to at least two firms and firm-specific “inferior” with respect to no firm in that industry. Using either definition, we find that analysts classified as “superior” in estimation samples generally remain superior in holdout periods. In contrast, we find that analysts identified as “inferior” in estimation samples do not remain inferior in holdout periods. Our results suggest that some analysts' earnings forecasts should be weighted higher than others when formulating composite earnings expectations. This suggestion is predicated on the assumption that capital markets distinguish between analysts who are ex ante superior, and that they utilize this information when formulating stock prices. Our study provides an ex ante framework for identifying those analysts who appear to be superior. When constructing weighted forecasts, a one-year estimation period should be used because we obtain the strongest results of persistence in this case.     

Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?

Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows: (1) the order book has a small-trade positive bid-ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; (2) the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; (3) the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; (4) If an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.     

中美服务贸易领域拓展及其途径选择

多年来,美国对华巨大贸易逆差使其对中国愈来愈不满,而并不刻意追求贸易顺差的中国也在试图转变经济增长方式,试图摆脱过于依赖出口和外资的不利局面本文分析了中美两国在新的经济切合点--服务贸易上的共同利益,阐述了两国可以率先扩大服务贸易领域及其操作方法.     

Inflation Uncertainty and Strike Activity

In this paper, we hypothesize that the general level of uncertainty can influence the level of strike activity. We test this hypothesis by considering the impact of inflation uncertain & on strike activity. Two databases are used: a pooled time-series cross-section sample of individual negotiations over the period 1971–1980, and quarterly data on negotiations from 1954 to 1980. Results from both data sets support the proposition that inflation uncertainty influences strike activity.     

Charter Value, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Emerging Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This paper examines two forces that may soon increase competition in the U.S. secondary conforming mortgage market: (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchase programs, and (2) the adoption of revised risk-based capital requirements for large U.S. banks (Basel II). We argue that this competition is likely to reduce the growth and relative importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hence reduce their charter values and effective capital. Such developments could, in turn, lead to more risky behaviors by these two companies. This last consequence warrants greater supervisory awareness and legal authorities.     

Judging the probability of a contingent loss: An empirical study*

Abstract. This paper reports the results of research in which experienced auditors interpreted the criteria of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (SFAS 5): Accounting for Contingencies. The research focuses on two issues: (1) the nature and degree of consensus in the auditors' interpretations, and (2) the extent to which these interpretations depend upon the type of contingent loss. Forty-five experienced auditors (managers, principals, and partners) from “Big 8” CPA firms responded to a research instrument that elicited their interpretation of SFAS 5 probability criteria. Our analysis focuses upon the thresholds between the “remote” and “reasonably possible” criteria and between the “reasonably possible” and “probable” criteria. Our results indicate: (1) threshold means of 0.16 and 0.68, respectively; (2) more auditor consensus for the first threshold than for the second; (3) the first threshold was significantly lower than indicated by previous research; and (4) the thresholds were generally not dependent upon the type of contingent loss.     

Growth,Industrialization, and the Intergenerational Correlation of Advantage

The shift from feudalism to industrial capitalism was generally accompanied by an increase in social mobility. We ask whether such an increase has occurred in a developing nation currently undergoing rapid industrialization, Indonesia. It has, at least as measured by a declining intergenerational correlation of education. To highlight the effects of economic growth on intergenerational mobility, we contrast Indonesia's experience with that of Bangladesh, where industrialization has proceeded more slowly and the correlation between parents’ and children's education has been roughly stable. We also examine potential causal channels for the rising educational mobility we find in Indonesia, but cannot identify specific pathways related to above‐average school building or rapid industrialization in a region.     

Strong-form efficiency on the Toronto Stock Exchange: An examination of analyst price forecasts*

Abstract. Strong-form efficiency on the Toronto Stock Exchange is examined by focusing on the stock price forecasts of brokerage-firm analysts who follow TSE firms. Two principal analyses are undertaken. First, there is considerable evidence in both the U.S. and U.K. that analysts possess valuable private information at the firm-specific level. This paper provides evidence that this finding is generalizable to Canadian analysts. Second, U.S. and U.K. studies generally have been based on a single-factor model (e.g., the CAPM). The choice of benchmarks (CAPM versus APT) has been shown to be important in a variety of contexts. We provide evidence that the choice of benchmark does not alter the fundamental conclusion that Canadian analysts possess valuable private information at the firm-specific level. Our findings have implications for accounting researchers, namely, the appropriateness of researchers to use CAPM in lieu of the computationally, more burdensome APT and the appropriateness of researchers to use Canadian analyst forecasts when a proxy is required for the (unobservable) market expectation. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent l'efficience « forte » de la Bourse de Toronto, en s'intéressant aux prévisions relatives au prix des actions formulées par les analystes des sociétés de courtage qui suivent les entreprises de la Bourse de Toronto. Deux analyses principales les mènent aux conclusions suivantes. Premièrement, les faits démontrent presque indubitablement que sur le marché des États-Unis aussi bien que sur celui du Royaume-Uni, les analystes possèdent de l'information à caractère privé utile, spécifique à l'entreprise. Les résultats de l'étude démontrent que cette constatation peut être généralisée aux analystes canadiens. Deuxièmement, les études des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni sont généralement fondées sur un modèle à un seul facteur (le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers, par exemple). Il a été établi que le choix des critères (le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers ou la théorie de l'établissement des prix par arbitrage) est important dans des circonstances très diverses. Les auteurs démontrent que le choix des critères n'a aucune incidence sur la conclusion fondamentale selon laquelle les analystes canadiens possèdent de l'information à caractère privé utile, spécifique à l'entreprise. Les résultats de leur étude entrainent certaines conséquences pour les chercheurs du domaine de la comptabilité: ils ont avantage à utiliser le modèle d'équilibre des marchés financiers de préférence à la théorie de l'établissement des prix par arbitrage, qui exige davantage de calculs, et à recourir aux prévisions des analystes canadiens lorsqu'il leur faut un substitut aux anticipations du marché (qui ne peuvent étre observées).     

Legitimating Inequality: Fooling Most of the People All of the Time

Over the three decades leading up to the crisis of 2008, inequality dramatically increased in the United States and Great Britain. What stands out, but is seldom noted, is that this occurred within democracies where the relative losers—the overwhelming majority—could in principle have used the political system to block or reverse rising inequality. Why did they not do so? A glance at history reveals that peoples have only very infrequently contested inequality because they were led to believe that their inferior status in terms of income, wealth, and privilege was just, that it was not really so bad, or that it was necessary for their future well‐being. Ideological systems legitimated a status quo of inequality, or in more modern times even increasing inequality. This article surveys the manner in which inequality has been historically legitimated, first predominantly by religion, then predominately by economic thought. Attention is then focused on the manner in which contemporary economic science and its popular interpretations in the media have served to legitimate inequality in the U.S. since the mid‐1970s. The article concludes with a reflection on the unique conditions that enable the legitimation of inequality to be delegitimated.