Productivity Growth in the Chinese Economy by Industry and the Role of Foreign Capital

I. IntroductionIt is well known that China’s reform and open-up policy initiated in 1978 had an extremelylarge impact on the Chinese economy. This policy represented an about-face against thetraditional self-reconstruction strategy that China had maintained since the founding ofthe people’s Republic in 1949. Although China’s economy temporarily fell into confusionfor a few years after the Tian-an-men incident in 1989, China continued to record high GDPgrowth. Moreover, after Deng Xiao…     

RULE CHANGES AND UNCERTAINTY IN DISCRIMINATORY AND UNIFORM PRICE AUCTIONS

The auction literature indicates that uncertainty about the value of auctioned goods increases underpricing in discriminatory price auctions. Such uncertainty has a smaller effect on uniform price auctions because the pricing rule aggregates bidders' information. We find that uncertainty resulting from inexperience with an auction mechanism has similar effects. Using initial public offering (IPO) data from Japan and Israel, we find that average underpricing increases temporarily in Japan's discriminatory price auctions after changes in the auction rules, which suggests that bidders reduce their bids in response to uncertainty. Underpricing in Israel's uniform price auctions is not affected by rule changes.     

Multilateral Comparison of Cost Structures in the Input–Output Tables of Japan,the US and West Germany

This paper presents a multilateral comparison of relative levels and structures of costs of production in Japan, the US and West Germany. The analysis is carried out by using harmonized input–output tables, which are converted at US prices by using adjusted sectoral purchasing power parities. A new accounting methodology is derived from recent developments of index number theory, whereas the chosen multilateral comparison procedure gives results that are invariant with respect to the order of the pairs of countries examined.     

Optimal pair-trading strategy over long/short/square positions—empirical study

Suzuki [Automatica, 2016, 67, 33–45] solves the optimal, finitely iterative, three-regime switching problem for investing in a mean-reverting asset that follows an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck price process and find explicit solutions. The remarkable feature of this model is that the investor can explicitly take either a long, short or square position and can switch the position, with transaction costs, during the investment period. We run empirical simulations of such multiple-regime switching models. There are very few such attempts in the existing literature because it is difficult to find, first, an explicit solution to the problem and second, appropriate financial assets that follow the artificial stochastic process required by the mathematical model. According to the Monte Carlo simulations of the optimal pair-trading strategy, the mean daily Sharp ratio is more than 2.3, whereas the mean Sharp ratio for the historical simulation of the ‘stub’ pairs (combinations of parent/subsidiary companies) is 0.6886. We believe that the results obtained from performing the empirical simulations are remarkable and consider that the optimal switching strategy of the rigorous mathematical model is applicable to businesses in the real world. For the reference many pseudo-program codes are added, which can help to replicate the optimal trading strategies.     

IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest

The underwriter of an IPO has two sources of compensation for its services on behalf of the issuer. One is through a commission (spread), the other is by buying issued shares for itself (or its affiliates) and reselling them in the post-issue market. Profits from the former decrease along with the magnitude of underpricing while profits from the latter increase with it. Faced with these countervailing interests, the present paper analyzes how the underwriter decides upon the pricing and allocation of IPOs.      

Optimal tracking for asset allocation with fixed and proportional transaction costs

This paper studies the asset allocation problem of optimally tracking a target mix of asset categories when there are transaction costs. We consider the trading strategy for an investor who is trying to minimize both fixed and proportional transaction costs while simultaneously minimizing the tracking error with respect to a specified, target asset mix. We use imupulse control theory in a continuous-time, dynamic setting to deal with this problem in a general and analytical way, showing that the optimal trading strategy can be characterized in terms of a quasi-variational inequality. We derive an explicit solution for the two-asset case, and we use this to provide a sensitivity analysis, showing how the optimal strategy depends upon individual input parameters. We also use some theory for one-dimensional diffusion processes to derive analytical expressions for various measures of performance such as the average time between transactions.     

The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance.     

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913–935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for doctors under these same conditions. That is, no group of doctors can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. We derive as a corollary of this result that no individually rational allocation is preferred by all the doctors to the doctor-optimal stable allocation.