The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism

We perform an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic consequences of international terrorism and interactions with alternative forms of collective violence. Our analysis is based on a rich unbalanced panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 2000, which brings together information from the Penn World Table data set, the ITERATE data set for terrorist events, and data sets of external and internal conflict. We explore these data with cross-sectional and panel growth regression analysis and a structural VAR model. We find that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict. As well, terrorism is associated with a redirection of economic activity away from investment spending and towards government spending. However, our investigation also suggests important differences both regarding the incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among different sets of countries. In OECD economies, in particular, terrorist incidents are considerably more frequent than in other nations, but the negative influence of these incidents on growth is smaller.     

The Euro Area Crisis: Politics over Economics

This paper explores the dominant role of politics in decisions made by euro area governments during the crisis. Decisions that appear to have been driven by local political considerations to the detriment of the euro area as a whole are discussed. The domination of politics over economics has led to crisis mismanagement. The underlying cause of tension is identified as a misalignment of political incentives. Member state governments tend to defend their own interests in a noncooperative manner. This has magnified the costs of the crisis and has resulted in an unbalanced and divisive incidence of the costs across the euro area. The example of Cyprus is discussed, where political decisions resulted in a transfer of about half of 2013 GDP from the island to cover losses elsewhere. In the absence of a federal government, no institution can adequately defend the interests of the euro area as a whole. European institutions appear weak and incapable of defending European principles and the proper functioning of the euro. Political reform is needed to sustain the euro but this is unlikely to pass the political feasibility test with the current governments of Europe.     

Optimal Discretion

We investigate the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem but no fundamental incompatibility between the policymaker's price stability and full employment objectives. We show that if discretion provides a policy flexibility benefit, then a rule is optimal only when inflation exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. This gives rise to a discretionary policy zone for inflation with the central bank taking more drastic action towards stabilizing inflation when inflation veers outside the zone. Imperfect credibility narrows the scope for discretion and enhances the benefits of adopting a rule.
JEL classification : E 58; D 82; C 72     

Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge

We examine the performance and robustness properties of monetary policy rules in an estimated macroeconomic model in which the economy undergoes structural change and where private agents and the central bank possess imperfect knowledge about the true structure of the economy. Policymakers follow an interest rate rule aiming to maintain price stability and to minimize fluctuations of unemployment around its natural rate but are uncertain about the economy's natural rates of interest and unemployment and how private agents form expectations. In particular, we consider two models of expectations formation: rational expectations (RE) and learning. We show that in this environment the ability to stabilize the real side of the economy is significantly reduced relative to an economy under RE with perfect knowledge. Furthermore, policies that would be optimal under perfect knowledge can perform very poorly if knowledge is imperfect. Efficient policies that take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural rates call for greater policy inertia, a more aggressive response to inflation, and a smaller response to the perceived unemployment gap than would be optimal if everyone had perfect knowledge of the economy. We show that such policies are quite robust to potential misspecification of private sector learning and the magnitude of variation in natural rates.     

Efficient Monetary Policy Design near Price Stability

Using dynamic programming methods, we study the design of optimal monetary policy in a simple, calibrated open-economy model and evaluate the effect of the liquidity trap generated by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. We show that the optimal policy near price stability is asymmetric. As inflation declines, policy turns expansionary sooner and more aggressively than would be optimal in the absence of the zero bound. This introduces an upward bias in the average level of inflation. We also discuss operational issues associated with the interpretation and implementation of policy at the zero bound in relation to the recent situation in Japan. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2000, 14(4), pp. 327–365. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551 Copyright 2000 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E31, E52, E58, E61.     

Evolving macroeconomic perceptions and the term structure of interest rates

We explore the role of evolving beliefs regarding the structure of the macroeconomy in improving our understanding of the term structure of interest rates within the context of a simple macro-finance model. Using quarterly vintages of real-time data and survey forecasts for the United States over the past 40 years, we show that a recursively estimated VAR on real GDP growth, inflation and the nominal short-term interest rate generates predictions that are more consistent with survey forecasts than a benchmark fixed-coefficient counterpart. We then estimate a simple term structure model under the assumption that investor risk attitude is driven by near-term expectations of the three state variables. When we allow for evolving beliefs about the macroeconomy, the resulting term structure model provides a better fit to the cross section of yields than the benchmark model, especially at longer maturities, and exhibits better performance in out-of-sample predictions of future yield movements.     

Myopia and Addictive Behaviour

We present a theory of addictive behaviour which can account for addicts' apparent disregard for the future consequences of their current actions. The discounting of future utility is increasing in past consumption, indicating increasingly myopic behaviour as consumption increases. The intertemporal complementarity generated by the endogenous discounting produces multiple steady states which can account for the simultaneous existence of myopic addicts and non-myopic non-addicts within a time consiste nt expected utility framework. The theory also accounts for the probabilistic incidence of addiction and successful rehabilitation and the possibility of recurrence.