Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle

We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.     

Is a Policy of Free Movement of Workers Sustainable?

In this paper, we study the costs and benefits of the adoption of a policy of free movement of workers. For countries to agree on uncontrolled movements of workers, short‐run costs must be outweighed by the long‐term benefits of better labor‐market flexibility and income smoothing. We show that such a policy is less likely to be adopted when workers are more impatient and less risk‐averse, when production technologies display stronger decreasing returns, and when countries trade a significant share of their products.     

Product Unbundling in the Travel Industry: The Economics of Airline Bag Fees

This paper provides theory and evidence on airline bag fees, offering insights into a real‐world case of product unbundling. The theory predicts that an airline's fares should fall when it introduces a bag fee, but that the full‐trip price (the bag fee plus the new fare) could either rise or fall. The empirical evidence presented in the paper provides strong confirmation of the first prediction. The data also suggest that the average fare falls by less than the bag fee itself so that the full price of a trip rises for passengers who choose to check bags.     

On the Consequences of Behavioral Adaptations in the Cost–Benefit Analysis of Road Safety Measures

It is sometimes argued that road safety measures or automobile safety standards fail to save lives because safer highways or safer cars induce more dangerous driving. A similar but less extreme view is that ignoring the behavioral adaptation of drivers would bias the cost–benefit analysis of a traffic safety measure. This article derives cost–benefit rules for automobile safety regulation when drivers may adapt their risk‐taking behavior in response to changes in the quality of the road network. The focus is on the financial externalities induced by accidents because of the insurance system as well as on the consequences of drivers' risk aversion. We establish that road safety measures are Pareto improving if their monetary cost is lower than the difference between their (adjusted for risk aversion) direct welfare gain with unchanged behavior and the induced variation in insured losses due to drivers' behavioral adaptation. The article also shows how this rule can be extended to take other accident external costs into account.     

Natural Disaster Insurance and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off

This article investigates the role of private insurance in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. We characterize the equity‐efficiency trade‐off faced by the policymakers under imperfect information about individual prevention costs. It is shown that a competitive insurance market with actuarial rate making and compensatory tax‐subsidy transfers is likely to dominate regulated uniform insurance pricing rules or state‐funded assistance schemes. The model illustrates how targeted tax cuts on insurance contracts can improve the incentives to prevention while compensating individuals with high prevention costs. The article highlights the complementarity between individual incentives through tax cuts and collective incentives through grants to the local jurisdictions where risk management plans are enforced.     

THE PRICE OF SILENCE: MARKETS FOR NOISE LICENSES AND AIRPORTS*

This article presents a market design for the management of noise pollution created by aircraft traffic around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise victims and to meet social acceptability. We show that the market allows the market designer to implement the social planner's optimal allocation of flights as long as the latter does not put too high a weight in his/her objective function on firms' profits compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The fact that local representatives of noise victims may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise licenses are likely to distribute windfall gains to residents, which alters the urban structure in the long run.     

Making ecotourism sustainable: refocusing on economic viability. Lessons learnt from the “Regional strategic action plan for coastal ecotourism development in the South Western Indian Ocean”

Ecotourism has become the focal point of a wide range of private and public sector development initiatives in the countries of the Western Indian Ocean. The 2008 “Regional Strategic Action Plan for Coastal Ecotourism Development in the South Western Indian Ocean” aimed at both a strategic assessment of current achievements and the development of recommendations for policy action. Drawing on the research data initially gathered for this report, the article demonstrates the importance of fostering criteria for ensuring medium and long-term economic viability in the assessment of sustainable ecotourism development performance, both at micro- and macro-economic levels. The arguments are presented in the form of eight lessons learnt, and the article approaches the question of economic viability at the different levels of enterprises, projects and products, and in terms of public policy and planning.     

On monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity: workers' rents also matter

Abstract .  In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled.