The Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Non-residential Fixed Investment and Housing

We specify a vector autoregression (VAR) model for the U.S. for 1980–2008 to investigate the statistical causal relationships between private non-residential fixed investment, the effective Federal funds rate, personal consumption expenditures, nonfinancial corporate profits, and the nonfinancial corporate credit market debt to test the validity of macroeconomic relationships in a macro model. The VAR utilizes the Toda-Yamamote procedure to test for Granger causality. Our preliminary results show that the transmission mechanism does not work as expected; we find that fixed investment depends on the level of demand in the economy and profits but not on the interest rate. This casts doubt on the usual assumptions about how the monetary transmission mechanism is expected to work. The second part of the paper investigates the effects of the change in the monetary regime towards low and stable interest rates, a policy pursued by the U.S. Fed since the beginning of the 1990s. We find that the new monetary policy regime has the following effects: (1) our VAR model does not support the hypothesis that low interest rates lead to higher fixed nonresidential investment; (2) low interest rates led to a search for higher yields through increasing risk, and (3) they led to an increase in the demand for securitized assets, especially mortgage-backed securities, which eventually resulted in a housing bubble. The overall results therefore raise doubts about the effectiveness of low interest rates as a policy regime designed as a component of a counter-cyclical policy.     

Inefficiencies in Public Environmental Services

The paper discusses efficiency issues in the public provision of environmental services, in particular waste water treatment. It is shown that in the face of increasing, respectively decreasing returns to scale the zero profit constraint of a cost minimizing public firm induces underinvestment, respectively overinvestment in public capacity compared with efficient allocation between public purification and effluent control by private polluters. X-inefficiency of the public firm counter-acts the inefficiency in allocation arising from overinvestment, and it reinforces the inefficiency in allocation in case of underinvestment in public purification capacity. As subsidy can bring down the user's charge imposed on sources, but it will also increase X-inefficiency. The subsidy counteracts underinvestment but reinforces overinvestment in public capacity.     

A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM*

Abstract In historical perspective, equity returns have been higher than interest rates but have also varied a good deal more. However, the average excess return has been larger than what could be expected based on classical equilibrium theory: the equity risk premium (ERP) puzzle. This paper has two objectives. First, the paper presents a comprehensive overview of the vast literature developed aimed at adjusting theory and testing the robustness of the puzzle. Here we will show that the failure of theory to link asset prices to economics is mostly quantitative by nature and not qualitative (anymore). Second, beyond providing a survey of theory, we aim for a relevant practical angle as well. Our main contribution is that we spend time on why returns have been higher than investors reasonably could have expected. We present evidence that forecasts of equity returns can be enhanced by valuation models: low valuation levels (low price‐to‐earnings ratios) portend high subsequent returns. While conventional wisdom (several years ago) was to use historical returns to forecast future returns, a growing consensus now recognizes that the predictive power of valuation ratios is preferred. Finally we provide some practical implications based on this predictability. While the ERP is essentially a long‐term issue, the likelihood of a lower risk premium increases risk for many and means that short‐term volatility might not be neglected.     

Corporate control rights and the long-run equity risk premium

We address the role of incomplete contracting in the equity market in a long-run growth model. Equity delivers control rights, but holding equity might lead to disutility, since the right to vote is costly to carry. We analyze voting power and its burden in a equilibrium growth model. One of our main contributions is that we test our ex ante equity premium model using data for 44 countries over the years 1989–2005. Higher capital productivity, inflation and valuation of leisure increase the ex ante equity premium, as does lower population growth.     

Corporate governance and stock returns in Asia

Despite years of study, the impact of firm-level governance on stock returns is not clear, especially in non-U.S. markets. We investigate the returns of governance-based trading strategies in Asia, using bias-free return data and CLSA governance ratings. We argue that poor governance should be associated with higher market risk. We find that a portfolio of poorly governed firms has a higher market beta, higher expected return and higher realized return, compared with a good governance portfolio. In contrast to some earlier studies, we find no abnormal returns after adjusting for risk and country effects. Only investors who can predict in advance which firms will improve their governance can earn abnormal returns.