Threshold cointegration and nonlinear adjustment between goods and services inflation in the United States

In this paper, we model the long-run relationship between goods and services inflation for the United States over the period 1968:1–2003:3. Our empirical methodology makes use of recent developments on threshold cointegration that consider the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between the two inflation series. According to our results, the null hypothesis of linear cointegration would be rejected in favor of a two-regime threshold cointegration model. Consequently, we could expect a cointegrating relationship only when the divergence between services inflation and goods inflation is above the threshold point estimate.     

Foreign direct investment, competition and industrial development in the host country

This paper analyses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the development of local firms. We focus on two likely effects of FDI: A competition effect which deters entry of domestic firms and positive market externalities which foster the development of local industry. Using a simple theoretical model to illustrate how these forces work we show that the number of domestic firms follows a u-shaped curve, where the competition effect first dominates but is gradually outweighed by positive externalities. Evidence for Ireland tends to support this result. Specifically, applying semi-parametric regression techniques on plant level panel data for the manufacturing sector we find that while the competition effect may have initially deterred local firms’ entry, this initial effect has been outpaced by positive externalities making the overall impact of FDI largely positive for the domestic industry.     

Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems

Summary This paper explores the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms yielding satisfactory solutions to the marriage and to the college admissions problem. Our first result is negative. We prove that no strategy-proof mechanism can always choose marriages that are individually rational and Pareto efficient. This strengthens a result by Roth (1982) showing that strategy-proof mechanisms cannot always select stable marriages. The result also applies, a fortiori, to college admissions. Since finding difficulties with strategy-proofness is quite an expected result, we then address a second question which is classical within the incentives literature. Are there restrictions on the preferences of agents under which strategy-proof and stable mechanisms do exist? We identify a nontrivial restriction on the domain of preferences, to be called top dominance, under which there exist strategy-proof and stable mechanisms for both types of matching problems. The mechanisms turn out to be exactly those that derive from the most classical algorithms in the literature; namely, the women's optimal, the men's optimal and the student's optimal. Finally, top dominance is shown to be essentially necessary, as well as sufficient, for the existence of strategy-proof stable matching mechanisms.This work is partially supported by grant PB 89-0294, from the Directión General de Investigatión Ciencia y Tecnología of the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia. Salvador Barberà is also grateful to the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. This research was initiated while both authors were visting GREMAQ, Université des Sciencies Sociales, Toulouse, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The paper extends results that were circulated as GREMAQ W.P. 91.22.232. We are grateful to Matthew Jackson and Marilda Sotomayor for their comments.     

Pricing to market behaviour in European car markets

This paper investigates PTM behaviour in European car markets for a period of great interest (1993-98), taking into account the role of invoicing currency. The results indicate that local currency price stability is a strong and pervasive phenomenon across products independently of the invoicing currency. The paper offers robustness checks, tests and arguments that justify the interpretation of this finding, at least in part, as evidence of PTM. It implies the existence of market segmentation and price discrimination, despite the completion of the single market programme on 1 January 1993.