An extended multinomial-Dirichlet model for error bounds for dollar-unit sampling*

Abstract. This paper describes an extension of the Tsui, Matsumura, and Tsui (1985) procedure, which is based on a multinomial distribution model within the dollar-unit sampling framework, with a Dirichlet prior distribution. The extended model and a different Dirichlet prior are used in this study to generate upper and lower bounds and two-sided confidence intervals for situations in which both understatement and overstatement errors are possible. The reported simulation study indicates that the achieved confidence levels of the proposed estimates are usually close to or greater than the nominal levels in repeated sampling for the populations studied. Résumé. Les auteurs décrivent une extension du procédé de Tsui, Matsumura et Tsui (1985) basée sur un modèle de distribution multinômiale dans le contexte de l'échantillonnage en unités monétaires, avec une distribution a priori de Dirichlet. Les auteurs utilisent l'extension du modèle et une distribution a priori de Dirichlet différente pour obtenir des limites supérieures et inférieures, et des intervalles de confiance bilatéraux pour les cas où des erreurs de sous-évaluation aussi bien que de surévaluation sont envisageables. L'étude de simulation qui fait l'objet du compte rendu montre que les niveaux de confiance obtenus relativement aux estimations proposées se rapprochent habituellement des valeurs nominales où les excèdent lorsqu'on procède à des échantillonnages répétés des populations à l'étude.     

Factor decomposition of sub-provincial fiscal disparities in China

With the help of fiscal statistics on sub-provincial public finances in the second half of the 1990s, this paper explores the hotly debated issues pertaining to fiscal disparities in China during this period, and the various factors driving the changes in fiscal disparities. Among them are economic factors (e.g., GDP per capita, economic structure), and institutional factors (e.g., urban–rural dichotomy, ethnic issues).We adopt Morduch and Sicular's general, regression-based approach to decompose fiscal disparity with respect to per capita fiscal expenditure (Morduch & Sicular, 2002). The empirical results indicate that among all the statistically significant factors, GDP per capita and urban–rural dichotomy are the two most important variables that affects fiscal disparities, with a total contribution of 60%. Other relatively important factors are economic structure and population density. Several features of fiscal expenditure in China identified by our empirical findings together with their corresponding policy implications are discussed.     

Analysis of real GDP growth rates of greater China: An asymmetric conditional volatility approach

Most empirical studies of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates exclude the dimension of conditional volatility shocks. In this paper, we search for evidence of conditional volatility in the quarterly real GDP of greater China, which comprises the economies of Mainland China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), and Taiwan. The widely accepted exponential GARCH model of Nelson [Econometrica 59 (1991) 347–370] is employed to capture the possible existence of asymmetric conditional volatility in real GDP. It is found that negative real GDP shocks may induce a greater impact on future volatilities compared with positive shocks of the same magnitude. Policy implications from our findings are discussed.     

RESOURCE CURSE,POLITICAL ENTRY,AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”