Is the Retail Gasoline Market Local or National?

This paper studies the effect of station density on prices in the retail gasoline market in the Czech Republic. We estimate the impact of the number of competing stations in various driving-distance ranges around each station on prices. We find that station density has a negative effect on prices; the effect decreases with distance and is statistically significant up to six kilometers. This suggests that the retail gasoline market is local rather than national.     

Grounded Theory und ihre bisherige Anwendung in der empirischen Controlling- und Rechnungswesenforschung

Zusammenfassung  Die Bildung von Forschungshypothesen ist zwar immer ein kreativer, sollte aber gleichzeitig kein unsystematischer Prozess sein. Im vorliegenden Artikel liegt der Fokus auf der Methodenunterstützung des Entdeckungszusammenhangs. Die Methode der Grounded Theory bietet einen Bezugsrahmen für qualitative empirische Studien, mit dem Theorien entwickelt werden, die aus dem Textmaterial zu begründen sind. Eine Literaturanalyse verdeutlicht, dass das Potenzial dieser Methode bisher in der Controlling- und Rechnungswesenforschung weitgehend ungenutzt bleibt. Anhand einer Diskussion empirischer Studien, welche auf die Methode zurückgreifen, werden Anwendungsm?glichkeiten der Grounded Theory für diese Disziplinen aufgezeigt.

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Summary  Creating research hypotheses is always a creative but not necessarily an unsystematic process. In our study we introduce a method supporting the logic of discovery. The grounded theory approach provides a framework for a systematic development of theories emerging from empirical data. A literature review stresses that the potential of the method so far is unused in accounting research. The grounded theory approach is introduced to support empirical work within this research field. Options for an application of the method in accounting research are shown by the means of a discussion of empirical studies. Furthermore the reader gets hints for reference studies.

     

Die Wirkung der Positionierung eines Zulieferunternehmens auf das Vertrauen des Kunden

Zusammenfassung Aus bisherigen Studien lassen sich kaum Handlungsempfehlungen ableiten, welche Positionierung eines Zulieferunternehmens sich besonders vorteilhaft auf das Vertrauen eines Kunden auswirkt. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Wirkungen von vier Positionierungsstrategien, die Zulieferunternehmen zur Verfügung stehen, auf das Vertrauen ihrer Abnehmer aus der Automobilindustrie untersucht. Diese Strategien bestehen in der Anpassung an Kundenprozesse, in Serviceorientierung, in Flexibilit?t und in der Verwendung von Kompetenzsignalen gegenüber dem Markt. Wir zeigen, dass die Anpassung an Kundenprozesse auf Grund der hohen Spezifit?t der damit verbundenen Investitionen die st?rkste positive Wirkung auf das Vertrauen des Kunden aufweist und dass Kompetenzsignale gegenüber dem Markt kein geeignetes Instrument zur F?rderung des Kundenvertrauens sind, wenn das Zulieferunternehmen für den Abnehmer eine hohe Bedeutung besitzt.

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The effects of a supplier’s positioning strategy on buyers’ trust

Summary Many studies have identified measures that are able to enhance partners’ trust in business-to-business relationships. However, it is not known which measures are more effective than others or under which conditions certain measures might be helpful or not. In the present study the effects of four possible positioning strategies on buyer’s trust are examined. The positioning strategies considered here are the supplier’s adaptations regarding its customer’s processes, its service orientation, its flexibility, and market-signals stressing the supplier’s competence. We found that, due to the high specificity of the required investments, adaptations of the supplier’s processes are the strongest instrument to enhance buyers’ trust relative to the other three strategies. We could also show that investments in market signals stressing the supplier’s competence are not effective if the supplier is of high importance to the customer.

     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.     

How Does a Development Moratorium Affect Development Timing Choices and Land Values?

This paper investigates how a development moratorium affects choices of development timing and land values in a framework where both the value of developed property evolves stochastically and the development costs are fully irreversible. We assume that a regulator initially announces that land is not allowed to be developed during a finite period of time in the future. A developer, thus, must decide whether to develop land before the timing ordinance is imposed, or after it expires. The development moratorium reduces the developer’s option value from waiting and, thus, accelerates development. We also use simulation analysis to demonstrate how the other factors that relate to the demand and supply conditions of the real estate market affect this accelerating effect.     

How Leviathan Taxes

The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights.