Banking scope and financial innovation

We explore the implications of financial system design for financialinnovation. We begin with assumptions about the investment opportunitiesof firms, their observable attributes, and the roles of commercialbanks, investment banks, and the financial market. We examinethe borrower's choice between bank and financial market funding,the commercial bank's choice of monitoring capacity, and theinvestment bank's choice of whether to invest in financial innovation.Our main result is that financial innovation in a universalbanking system is stochastically lower than innovation in afinancial system in which commercial and investment banks arefunctionally separated.     

Litigation risk, intermediation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings

We formally examine the role of litigation risk in initial publicoffering (IPO) pricing. The underwriter's pricing decision tradesoff current revenue against expected future litigation costs,both of which are increasing in the IPO price. Given a time-consistencyconstraint and rational expectations on the part of investors,however, the 'standard' litigation risk argument does not leadto equilibrium underpricing. We develop a richer model thatprovides sufficient conditions under which there is equilibriumunderpricing. The issuer's choice of employing an underwriterversus floating the IPO on its own is examined, and varioustestable implications of the model are developed.     

Financial system architecture

This article builds a theory of financial system architecture.We ask: what is a financial market, what is a bank, and whatdetermines the economic role of each? Starting with basic assumptionsabout primitives-the types of agents and the nature of informationalasymmetries-we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesceto form banks and which trade in the capital market. It is shownthat borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financialmarket. Moreover, a financial system in its infancy will bebank-dominated, and increased financial market sophisticationdiminishes bank lending.     

Competitive equilibrium with type convergence in an asymmetrically informed market

This article studies an asymmetric information game with 'typeconvergence', in which, under some realizations of a commonuncertainty, inducing informed agents to reveal their typesthrough self-selection by contract choice is either costly orimpossible. Under other realizations, self-selection permitscostless distinctions between informed agents. I obtain sufficientconditions under which contracting with options prior to therealization of the common uncertainty leads to the existenceof a perfectly separating, costless Nash equilibrium. Applicationsto variable rate loan commitments and life insurance contractingare discussed.     

Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt

We show that the incentive for managers to build their reputationsdistorts firms' investment policies in favor of relatively safeprojects, thereby aligning managers' interests with those ofbondholders, even though managers are hired and fired by shareholders.Tbis effect opposes the familiar agency problem of risky debtthat is imperfectly covenant-protected, wherein shareholdersare tempted to favor excessively risk projects in order to expropriatebondholders. Consequently, when managerial concern for reputationresults in conservatism, it can actually make shareholders betteroff ex ante by allowing the firm to issue more debt. We examinehow the optimal choice of leverage from the shareholders' standpointis influenced by takeover activity, and how the adoption ofantitakeover measures affects a firm's investment policy andleverage choice.