Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances*

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European‐wide emission trading system, we examine the trade‐off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output‐based and emissions‐based allocation rules. We show that the emissions‐based allocation rule is more costly than the output‐based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy‐intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions‐based allocation vis‐à‐vis output‐based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.     

A History of the D–Mark's Real External Value

An equilibrium time path of the real effective exchange rate of Germany's currency in the post Bretton Woods period is calculated. For this purpose, a NATREX model for the long–run determination of this specific variable is developed. A cointegration analysis gives evidence in favour of the model and provides the equilibrium values. The theoretical and empirical results are used to analyse in detail movements in the real exchange rate of the D–Mark. Estimation results suggest, among other things, that the D–Mark has mostly been overvalued and that it often adjusted with some delay to changes in the fundamentals.     

How Issue Size, Risk, and Complexity are Influencing External Financing Costs: German IPOs Analyzed from an Economies of Scale Perspective

This paper is focused on the cost of raising capital in Germany. A cross-sectional analysis of flotation cost data for 117 IPOs over the years 1993–1998 is presented. We find average flotation costs to be 7.77 percent of gross proceeds, while underwriting fees average 5.01 percent. Our results extend the literature in two important directions. First, contrary to the conventional economies of scale view we find marginal spreads to be rather constant in gross proceeds and to be higher for more risky and more complex offerings. Fixed costs amount to 5 to 9 percent of underwriting fees. Second, by applying a principal component analysis we find issue size, an issuer risk factor, and an offering method complexity factor to have an economicaly meaningful impact on underwriting fees.     

Formal business process engineering based on graph grammars

Designing and managing a company's specific landscape and its business processes has been identified as a great challenge for several years. Business processes are highly dynamic and distributed and can only rarely be planned, modeled and analyzed completely. For a computer-aided business process system, which supports the designing and managing process, first of all a powerful uniform formalism is necessary, where all necessary knowledge concerning company's and its processes can be represented. In this paper we will concentrate on the introduction of such a formal methodology to describe business processes, company organization structures and information technology structures in one uniform formalism. The ideas we use are mainly based on methods from graph grammars, process management, Artificial Intelligence and business process (re)engineering.     

Principles for a European Union''s Public Debt

The EU has neither the power to tax nor the right to run a public debt. We analyze if the EU should receive the right for public indebtedness. We make use of the normative theory of public indebtedness and of positive political economy analysis. Our normative analysis identified specific cases for an appropriate use of public indebtedness. According to the political economy analysis, a misuse of public debt may be possible. As the implementation of strict constitutional constraints can limit this misuse, we propose the assignment of a right to public borrowing to the EU within tight constitutional restrictions.     

Carbon Taxes and Joint Implementation. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for Germany and India

Germany has committed itself toreducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. Toachieve this goal, the government has recentlylaunched an environmental tax reform whichentails a continuous increase in energy taxesin conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut innon-wage labor costs. This policy is supposedto yield a double dividend, reducing both, theproblem of global warming and high unemploymentrates. In addition to domestic actions,international treaties on climate protectionallow for the supplementary use of flexibleinstruments to exploit cheaper emissionreduction possibilities elsewhere. One concreteoption for Germany would be to enter jointimplementation (JI) with developing countriessuch as India where Germany pays emissionreduction abroad rather than meeting itsreduction target solely by domestic action. Inthis paper, we investigate whether anenvironmental tax reform cum JI providesemployment and overall efficiency gains ascompared to an environmental tax reformstand-alone. We address this question in theframework of a large-scale general equilibriummodel for Germany and India where Germany mayundertake JI with the Indian electricitysector. Our main finding is that JI offsetslargely the adverse effects of carbon emissionconstraints on the German economy. JIsignificantly lowers the level of carbon taxesand thus reduces the total costs of abatementas well as negative effects on labor demand. Inaddition, JI triggers direct investment demandfor energy efficient power plants produced inGermany. This provides positive employmenteffects and additional income for Germany. ForIndia, joint implementation equips itselectricity industry with scarce capital goodsleading to a more efficient power productionwith lower electricity prices for the economyand substantial welfare gains.     

The Downside of Knowledge Spillovers: An Explanation for the Dispersion of High-tech Industries

Both theoretical work on knowledge spillovers and regional policy initiatives often assume that there exists a general and unanimous advantage for firms to cluster. But opposed to the benefit is the disadvantage of sharing knowledge with other (rival) firms. This paper highlights the “downside” associated with knowledge spillovers and presents a four-stage game of location choice where spillovers result from labour poaching and where the strategic interaction between firms may make them avoid co-location with spillovers. The model provides an explanation for the dispersion of German high-tech industries found in a companion paper.