Skill-Specific rather than General Education: A Reason for US–Europe Growth Differences?

In this paper, we develop a model of technology adoption and economic growth in which households optimally obtain either a concept-based, general education or a skill-specific, vocational education. General education is costly to obtain, but enables workers to operate new production technologies. Firms weigh the cost of adopting and operating new technologies against increased profits and optimally choose the level of adoption. We show that an economy whose policies favor vocational education will grow slower in equilibrium than one that favors general education. More importantly, the gap between their growth rates will increase with the growth rate of available technology. By characterizing the optimal Ramsey education policy we also demonstrate that the optimal subsidy for general education increases with the growth rate of available technology. Our theory suggests that European education policies that favored specialized, vocational education might have worked well, both in terms of growth rates and welfare, during the 1960s and 1970s when available technologies changed slowly. However, in the information age of the 1980s and 1990s when new technologies emerged at a more rapid pace, they might have contributed to an increased growth gap relative to the United States.     

Teaching the Minimum Wage in Econ 101 in Light of the New Economics of the Minimum Wage

The author argues that the recent controversy over the effect of the minimum wage on employment offers an opportunity for teaching introductory economics. Research findings on the minimum wage could be used to motivate alternative models of the labor market, such as monopsony and search models, and to teach students how economists test hypotheses with data.     

LABOR TURNOVER IN THE USA AND JAPAN: A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES

Abstract. The labor turnover rate in Japan is less than half the US level. A small-scale survey of companies that operate in both Japan and the USA was conducted to examine reasons for the discrepancy. The main findings are that Japanese human resource policies, including steep seniority-earnings profiles, extensive fringe benefits, participatory management, and a reluctance to recruit experienced workers from other firms, contribute to the lower Japanese turnover rate. Additionally, workers of Japanese descent in the USA have a somewhat lower labor turnover rate than other Americans, suggesting some role for cultural differences.     

Devaluation and its consequences in developing countries

To analyze the role of the trade and payments regime in economic development the National Bureau of Economic Research undertook a major research project on this issue. In this article a brief report on some of the findings pertaining to the effect of exchange rates, i. e. devaluation under exchange control is provided.     

An enduring need: multilateralism in the twenty-first century

That the global economy has been hugely successful over thepast 50 years is unquestionable. A major underpinning of thatsuccess has been the open multilateral system, which has enabledthe emergence of a truly international financial system, reciprocalreduction of trade barriers, and the emergence of many previouslypoor countries into the status of ‘emerging markets’or even ‘developed’. The open multilateral system,however, is increasingly under-appreciated and taken for granted.Preferential trading arrangements have proliferated, and withthem the possibility of discriminatory arrangements for capitalflows. The absence of an international regime for capital flowspermits this development and poses a threat to the system, asdo all of the issues on which countries' governments assert‘their’ interests, and ignore their interests inthe overall health of the system. It is to be hoped that thebenefits of multilateralism are more greatly appreciated, andthat the current trend toward increasing regionalism and departuresfrom the post-war system is reversed.     

De Tocqueville's ‘Dangerous Moment’: The Importance of Getting Reforms Right

Economic reform, on an ongoing basis, is vital if economies are to achieve, and maintain, rapid and sustained economic growth. Yet governments face challenges when introducing economic reforms. Policymakers must judge what reforms are needed; when to introduce them; and how rapidly to pursue their reform programme. Failed reforms can discredit the reform process as a whole, and so make it more difficult, and more costly, to retry in the future. The reform process in emerging market economies provides many lessons that are widely applicable. Perseverance is critical: reforms must be followed through if they are to be successful. Reforms also need to be wide‐ranging, encompassing not just monetary, fiscal and trade policy but reform of the financial sector and of public institutions. Reforms in many countries need to include the protection of property and individual rights; improved tax administration and greater efficiency of public spending; and commercial codes. Reforms can be most easily implemented at times of global expansion. Fiscal consolidation, for example, is more easily accomplished in a more favourable environment partly because it helps deliver future growth and partly because it gives governments scope for counter‐cyclical policy during future downturns.     

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. We demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogoff [1989. Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget? American Economic Review 79, 43-50]. From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.