The Repugnant Conclusion and Utilitarianism under Domain Restrictions

The paper investigates the problem of the repugnant conclusion in variable‐population social choice. A choice rule exhibits the repugnant conclusion if, given any alternative in which all individuals enjoy a high quality of life, there is always a better alternative (according to the choice rule) in which the population is larger and each individual has a life which is barely worth living. While it is well‐known that classical utilitarianism (CU) exhibits the repugnant conclusion on an unrestricted domain, the paper shows that critical‐level utilitarianism (CLU) also exhibits the repugnant conclusion on an unrestricted domain when repugnance is defined in terms of the critical level. In contrast, both CU and CLU are shown to avoid the repugnant conclusion on a restricted domain defined by bounded resources, the law of conservation of matter, concavity and monotonicity of preferences, positive subsistence consumption, and positive “neutral consumption.” In light of the universality of these restrictions, one may conclude that the problem of the repugnant conclusion may not be as great as previously thought.     

Inconsistency in U.S. Accounting Standards: The Treatment of Interest

Consistency is an essential part of financial reporting: it applies both to the continuous use of the same accounting principles by an entity from period to period, and to consistency between various accounting principles used by the same entity. In the development of accounting standards, risks to users of inconsistencies can be reduced by good disclosure requirements, particularly so between various pronouncements. A study examining the treatment of interest found inconsistencies in two-thirds of the relevant U.S. GAAP pronouncements.     

Financial Identity‐Processing Styles Among Young Adults: A Longitudinal Study of Socialization Factors and Consequences for Financial Capabilities

Using identity theory as a basis for conceptualizing and clustering the financial identity‐processing styles of young adults, this study examines antecedent socialization factors and consequent financial capabilities associated with those clusters. Using two‐timed longitudinal surveys (N = 1,511) of college students, we proposed and confirmed three financial identity‐processing styles, resembling Berzonsky's three identity‐processing styles (i.e., informational, normative, and diffused‐avoidant). Labeled Pathfinders, Followers and Drifters: these three clusters were profiled with respect to their socialization factors and financial capabilities. We concluded that identity theory can be applied to the financial domain, financial identity‐processing styles are influenced by socialization factors (e.g., parents, learning), and these styles have consequences for individuals' financial capabilities (financial knowledge, self‐efficacy, attitudes, and behaviors). Insights from this study may inform the design and implementation of effective financial parenting, financial education and intervention programs, and identify those young adults who may benefit from education and intervention efforts .     

The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture in Globalizing Cities

The focus of this article is on the role of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in and around architecture in the production and marketing of iconic buildings and spaces, in global or world cities. The TCC is conceptualized in terms of four fractions: (1) Those who own and/or and control the major transnational corporations and their local affiliates (corporate fraction). In architecture these are the major architectural, architecture‐engineering and architecture‐developer‐real estate firms. In comparison with the major global consumer goods, energy and financial corporations the revenues of the biggest firms in the architecture industry are quite small. However, their importance for the built environment and their cultural importance, especially in cities, far outweighs their relative lack of financial and corporate muscle. (2) Globalizing politicians and bureaucrats (state fraction). These are the politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of administrative power and responsibility who actually decide what gets built where, and how changes to the built environment are regulated. (3) Globalizing professionals (technical fraction). The members of this fraction range from the leading technicians centrally involved in the structural features of new building to those responsible for the education of students and the public in architecture. (4) Merchants and media (consumerist fraction). These are the people who are responsible for the marketing of architecture in all its manifestations. (There is obviously some overlap between the membership of these fractions.). My conclusion is that many global and aspiring global cities have looked to iconic architecture as a prime strategy of urban intervention, often in the context of rehabilitation of depressed areas. The attempt to identify the agents most responsible for this transformation, namely the TCC, and to explain how they operate, suggests that deliberately iconic architecture is becoming a global phenomenon, specifically a central urban manifestation of the culture‐ideology of consumerism. L’article porte sur la classe capitaliste transnationale (TCC) au sein et à la périphérie de l’architecture, et sur son rôle dans la production et la commercialisation de constructions et espaces iconiques dans les villes mondiales ou planétaires. Cette classe se conceptualise en quatre fractions: (1) Ceux qui détiennent et/ou contrôlent les principaux groupes transnationaux et leurs sociétés affiliées locales (fraction économique): En architecture, il existe de grands cabinets d’architecture, d’ingénierie en architecture et d’architectes promoteurs immobiliers. Par rapport aux grosses sociétés multinationales de la finance, de l’énergie ou des biens de consommation, les recettes des plus importants cabinets sont assez faibles; pourtant, leur place dans l’environnement construit et la culture, notamment en milieu urbain, compensent largement leur impact relativement mince sur le plan financier et économique. (2) Les acteurs politiques et bureaucratiques de la mondialisation (fraction étatique): Il s’agit des politicients et bureaucrates à tous les niveaux de responsabilié et de pouvoir administratifs qui décident effectivement de ce qui est construit et où, ainsi que de la régulation des changements apportés à l’environnement construit. (3) Les acteurs professionnels de la mondialisation (fraction technique): Leur diversité va des techniciens de renom, surtout impliqués dans les caractéristiques structurelles des nouveaux bâtiments, à ceux qui sont chargés d’enseigner l’architecture aux étudiants et d’éduquer le public. (4) Marchands et médias (fraction consumériste): Ce sont les personnes responsables de la commercialisation de l’architecture dans toutes ses manifestations. Ces quatre fractions présentent bien sûr des intersections. On peut déduire que bon nombre de villes planétaires — ou aspirant à le devenir — ont opté pour une architecture iconique comme première stratégie d’intervention urbaine, souvent dans un contexte de réhabilitation de zones en déclin. Identifier les principaux agents responsables de cette transformation (la TCC) et expliquer leur mode de fonctionnement conduit à suggérer qu’une architecture délibérément iconique devient un phénomène mondial, plus précisément une manifestation urbaine essentielle de l’idéologie‐culture du consumérisme.     

FORM OF CONTROL: A CRITICAL DETERMINANT OF ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE AND CEO REWARDS

Based on two research streams, we investigate whether acquiring firms’ form of control might be associated differently with CEO rewards or excess returns. We theoretically reason that in manager-controlled corporations acquisitions may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders and CEO rewards might be based on nonperformance criteria. In owner-manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms acquisitions may benefit the stockholders. While CEO rewards of owner-controlled firms may be based on performance criteria, however, executive rewards of owner-manager-controlled firms may be based on both performance and nonperformance factors. The findings indicate that for manager-controlled firms acquisition announcements result in negative excess returns to shareholders. For owner-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms such announcements result in positive excess returns. The findings also suggest that increases in corporate size due to acquisitions are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards of manager-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms. For owner-controlled firms, excess returns are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.