Quality dualism

We suggest a theory of quality dualism, defined in terms of the gap between the highest quality good produced in the informal sector and the lowest quality produced in the formal sector. We develop a model of vertically differentiated products, in which firms producing in the formal and informal sectors face different factor prices, and have a relative advantage in the manufacture of different qualities. We then use the model to examine the cyclical behavior of the respective sizes of the two sectors. Finally, we point out that factor price changes, which reduce or increase the size of the informal sector, may have the same or opposite effect on the degree of dualism in the economy.     

Conservation,Discrimination, and Salvation: Investors’ Social Concerns in the Stock Market

Stocks appear to have investor clienteles based on their business practices and products. The variety in expressive benefits each individual receives from owning controversial stocks causes them to modify their portfolio to accommodate their beliefs. We examine the ownership of firms with social concerns and sin stocks (tobacco, alcohol and gambling). Women tilt their portfolios towards stocks with progressive labor policies for women and minorities. Younger investors avoid companies with poor environmental records but seek companies with progressive labor policies. Democratic voters favor stocks with progressive policies regarding women/minorities and gays/lesbians and are less likely to own sin stocks. Christian objections to homosexuality lead their members to invest less in stocks with progressive labor policies for gays and lesbians. The Christian denominations vary, though, in regard to sin stocks. Catholics are more likely while Mormons are less likely to own a sin stock relative to other investors. Socially responsible investors are clearly not all alike. Social characteristics that are important to one investor may not be important to another socially conscious investor.     

PRINCIPLES OF- ENGINEERING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS by John A. White,Marvin H. Agee and Kenneth E. Case,John Wiley & Sons,Inc., New York, 1984, 2nd Ed., xii + 546 pp., List $32.95.

In his three recent papers [3], [4], and [5], R.G. Beaves develops an Overall Rate of Return (ORR) project evaluation criterion based on the concept of the so-called transition point (TP) which he has defined in two different versions.¹ In the present contribution, it is shown that some projects may produce undefined ORRs for either TP version, and that other ORR-like criteria [7] may also generate undefined results for projects for which the Net Present Value (NPV) criterion is defined. To eliminate the cases of the ORR undefinability, a generalization of the ORR criterion is proposed that makes this criterion fully NPV compatible and applicable to both investment and financing projects. This criterion embraces all the existing ORR approaches that are based on the notions of the initial and terminal wealths, including both of Beaves' approaches.     

The Effect of Bank Debt Downgrades on Stock Prices of Other Banks

We find that debt downgrades of money center banks elicit negative stock price responses in nondowngraded money center banks. Stock prices of larger regional banks also react to these downgrades. Although downgrades of regional banks evoke negative stock price responses for regional banks in the same geographic region, the importance of geographic region as a factor determining the extent of intra‐industry reactions has diminished since 1989. Our results indicate that the merger and expansion activities triggered by interstate banking have blurred differences between regional and money center banks as interstate banking activity has moved towards nationwide banking     

Does the Type of Political Regime Matter for Trade and Labor Market Policies?

This article uses cross-country data to examine the link betweena country's type of political regime and its degree of opennessand labor market distortion. The analysis indicates that moreauthoritarian regimes are associated with higher trade protectionand greater labor market distortions. This supports the viewthat political authoritarianism may be counterproductive todevelopment in important respects.     

RAISING CAPITAL WITH PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF DEBT

In this study the role of private placements of debt in the capital acquisition decision of public utilities is investigated. Whereas public offerings are sales of securities through financial intermediaries to the public-at-large, private placements are direct sales of securities by an issuing corporation to a limited number of institutional investors. In contrast to the negative stock price reactions typically found for public security sales, private placements are associated with significant positive abnormal returns in the shares of the issuing public utilities. Also, larger private placements appear to elicit a more favorable market response. Results are consistent with reduced information asymmetries and increased monitoring of the issuing firm resulting from the private placement.     

Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring

If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, individual lending is inefficient. The literature typically offers solutions based on the assumption of full peer information to solve adverse selection problems and peer monitoring to solve moral hazard problems. In contrast, I show that it is possible to construct a simple budget-balanced mechanism that implements the efficient outcome even if each borrower knows only own type and effort, and has neither privileged knowledge about others nor monitoring ability. The mechanism satisfies participation incentives for all types, and is immune to the Rothschild–Stiglitz cream skimming problem despite using transfers from better types to worse types. The presence of some local information implies that the mechanism cannot be successfully used by formal lenders. Thus a local credit institution can emerge as an optimal response to the informational environment even without peer information or monitoring. Finally, I investigate the role of monitoring in this setting and show how costly monitoring can increase the scope of the mechanism.     

The role of interpersonal affect in performance appraisal: evidence from two samples – the US and India

The interpersonal affect, a li ke–dislike relationship between a supervisor and his/her subordinate, has traditionally been conceptualized as a source of bias in performance appraisals. However, some researchers have argued that the interpersonal affect may not be a bias, especially where it develops as a result of past performance. In this field study, using data from 190 supervisors in the US, and 113 supervisors in India, we delineate the relationship between interpersonal affect and performance ratings. In both samples, interpersonal affect and performance level were found to have significant effects on performance ratings. Results from the US sample indicated that raters are able to separate their liking for a subordinate from actual performance when a ssigning performance ratings, suggesting that the interpersonal affect does not operate as a bias in the appraisal process. Results from the Indian sample, however, suggest that supervisors inflate ratings of low performers, suggesting that local cultural norms may be operating as a moderator.