A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?

Since September, 1976, stocks newly included into the Standard and Poor's 500 Index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the inclusion. This return does not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion. The returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds, consistent with the hypothesis that demand curves for stocks slope down. The returns are not related to S & P's bond ratings, which is inconsistent with a plausible version of the hypothesis that inclusion is a certification of the quality of the stock.     

Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach

We explore the determinants of liquidation values of assets, particularly focusing on the potential buyers of assets. When a firm in financial distress needs to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems themselves, leading to asset sales at prices below value in best use. Such illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad times, and so ex ante is a significant private cost of leverage. We use this focus on asset buyers to explain variation in debt capacity across industries and over the business cycle, as well as the rise in U.S. corporate leverage in the 1980s.     

The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading

Recent empirical research has identified a significant amount of volatility in stock prices that cannot easily be explained by changes in fundamentals; one interpretation is that asset prices respond not only to news but also to irrational “noise trading.” We assess the welfare effects and incidence of such noice trading using an overlapping-generations model that gives investors short horizons. We find that the additional risk generated by noise trading can reduce the capital stock and consumption of the economy, and we show that part of that cost may be borne by rational investors. We conclude that the welfare costs of noise trading may be large if the magnitude of noise in aggregate stock prices is as large as suggested by some of the recent empirical litrature on the excess volatility of the market.     

Diagnostic Expectations and Credit Cycles

We present a model of credit cycles arising from diagnostic expectations—a belief formation mechanism based on Kahneman and Tversky's representativeness heuristic. Diagnostic expectations overweight future outcomes that become more likely in light of incoming data. The expectations formation rule is forward looking and depends on the underlying stochastic process, and thus is immune to the Lucas critique. Diagnostic expectations reconcile extrapolation and neglect of risk in a unified framework. In our model, credit spreads are excessively volatile, overreact to news, and are subject to predictable reversals. These dynamics can account for several features of credit cycles and macroeconomic volatility.     

Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation

Analyses of rational speculation usually presume that it dampens fluctuations caused by “noise” traders. This is not necessarily the case if noise traders follow positive-feedback strategies—buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. It may pay to jump on the bandwagon and purchase ahead of noise demand. If rational speculators' early buying triggers positive-feedback trading, then an increase in the number of forward-looking speculators can increase volatility about fundamentals. This model is consistent with a number of empirical observations about the correlation of asset returns, the overreaction of prices to news, price bubbles, and expectations.     

Institutional Quality and International Trade

Institutions—quality of contract enforcement, property rights, shareholder protection, and the like—have received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences, beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modelled within the framework of incomplete contracts. We show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity. Institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply, among other things, that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade. Second, we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade, using data on U.S. imports disaggregated by country and industry. The empirical results provide evidence of "institutional content of trade": institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows.     

Money Doctors

We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average underperform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.     

Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts are correlated with prices of other securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, we find that both closed-end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well.     

Quality,experience, and monopoly: the Soviet market for weapons under Stalin1

Monopoly is a particular problem in markets where experience goods are traded, since the consumer cannot respond to bad experiences by switching repeat purchases to another supplier. New evidence shows how the defence ministry as buyer in the Soviet market for military goods responded to this problem by investing in an evaluation of quality prior to purchase, by showing reluctance to buy, and by exploiting the available non‐market means to influence the defence industry as supplier. The effectiveness of these stratagems was limited by the defence industry's counteractions and because the buyer had no choice but to come to a compromise with the supplier.