More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk Assessment and Program Planning Tools in a Fraud Setting*

This study examines the impact of alternative risk assessment (standard risk checklist versus no checklist) and program development (standard program versus no program) tools on two facets of fraud planning effectiveness: (1) the quality of audit procedures relative to a benchmark validated by a panel of experts, and (2) the propensity to consult fraud experts. A between‐subjects experiment, using an SEC enforcement fraud case, was conducted to examine these relationships. Sixty‐nine auditors made risk assessments and designed an audit program. We found that auditors who used a standard risk checklist, structured by SAS No. 82 risk categories, made lower risk assessments than those without a checklist. This suggests that the use of the checklist was associated with a less effective diagnosis of the fraud. We also found that auditors with a standard audit program designed a relatively less effective fraud program than those without this tool but were not more willing to seek consultation with fraud experts. This suggests that standard programs may impair auditors' ability to respond to fraud risk. Finally, our results show that fraud risk assessment (FRASK) was not associated with the planning of more effective fraud procedures but was directly associated with the desire to consult with fraud specialists. This suggests that one benefit of improved FRASK is its relation with consultation. Overall, the findings call into question the effectiveness of standard audit tools in a fraud setting and highlight the need for a more strategic reasoning approach in an elevated risk situation.     

TAX REFORM

After brief individual presentations, panelists discuss among themselves and with the audience a broad spectrum of issues regarding various taxes and tax reform proposals. The discussion includes such issues as privatizing Social Security and Medicare, eliminating income tax withholding, and the merits and demerits of income taxes, consumption taxes, value added taxes, sales taxes, and taxes on resources that have an inelastic supply. One panelist relates his recent experiences using his tools as an economist to deal with tax and related issues as a current member of the Canadian Parliament. Another cites practical problems of implementing tax reform from his long experience advising governments, especially in Latin America. A major focus of the exchange of views is on public choice problems involved in passing and implementing a so-called flat tax. However, the discussion also deals with economic efficiency and equity considerations and with nearly all other types of taxes. The discussion includes not only the impact on the country within which tax reform occurs, but international implications, as well.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND VOUCHER BUY-OUTS IN RUSSIA

This paper examines the issues which may create pressures and incentives to introduce efficiency-enhancing governance structures in enterprises which are privatized through voucher schemes in Russia. These pressures emphasize the need to view buy-outs created on privatization as transitory organizational forms with a three-stage process being suggested as the most feasible for developing governance mechanisms which produce efficiency gains, The paper uses illustrative case studies of the first major enterprises to experience post-privatization ownership changes.