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Firms use active political strategies not only to mitigate uncertainty emanating from legislative activity, but also to enhance their growth opportunities. We find that a firm's systematic risk (beta) can be hedged away by employing various political strategies involving the presence of former politicians on corporate boards of directors, contributions to political campaigns, and corporate lobbying activities. The hedging effect is greater when firms operate in more uncertain industries. In addition, active political strategies are associated with greater firm heterogeneity and make real options more value relevant as potential drivers of competitive advantages in uncertain environments.  相似文献   
2.
We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts' self-selection bias.  相似文献   
3.
This study shows that less readable 10‐K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, if the manipulation is accompanied by complex 10‐K reports.  相似文献   
4.
This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand‐collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk‐taking tendencies induced by political connections.  相似文献   
5.
This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.  相似文献   
6.
We extend the literature on MNC performance by examining the relationship between market valuation of MNCs and intangibles associated with financial expertise. We identify firms as having financial expertise if they have diversified their business in the financial sector. We argue that financial expertise enhances the ability of MNCs to internalize financial transactions and take advantage of financing and investment opportunities around the world. Therefore, it is a potentially significant source of market power. Our test results demonstrate that as the degree of multinationality increases market valuation is positively related with financial expertise even after we account for several other control factors. Our findings imply that MNCs with financial expertise can be viewed as possessing an additional intangible, which essentially is the financial equivalent of the traditionally examined intangible assets, such as technological “know-how,” goodwill, and managerial expertise.  相似文献   
7.
Several empirical studies show that investment strategies that favor the purchase of stocks with low prices relative to conventional measures of value yield higher returns. Some of these studies imply that investors are too optimistic about (glamour) stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about (value) stocks that have performed poorly. We examine whether investors systematically overestimate (underestimate) the future earnings performance of glamour (value) stocks over the 1976 to 1997 period. Our results fail to support the extrapolation hypothesis that posits that the superior performance of value stocks is because investors make systematic errors in predicting future growth in earnings of out–of–favor stocks.  相似文献   
8.
We examine whether family ownership affects the value impact of the operational and financial dimensions of firms’ hedging policies. We show that family firms’ market valuations are higher than those of non‐family firms, consistent with the view that family firms benefit from family owners’ long‐term perspectives and ability to monitor managers. In addition, while both operational and financial hedging policies per se are valuable in non‐family firms, they do not create any value in family firms. These results support the notion that the founding families’ need to hedge the risk of their undiversified personal wealth portfolio leads to suboptimal risk management decisions.  相似文献   
9.
We show that political geography has a pervasive effect on the cross-section of stock returns. We collect election results over a 40-year period and use a political alignment index (PAI) of each state's leading politicians with the ruling (presidential) party to proxy for local firms’ proximity to political power. Firms whose headquarters are located in high PAI states outperform those located in low PAI states, both in terms of raw returns, and on a risk-adjusted basis. Overall, although we cannot rule out indirect political connectedness advantages as an explanation of the PAI effect, our results are consistent with the notion that proximity to political power has stock return implications because it reflects firms’ exposure to policy risk.  相似文献   
10.
We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.  相似文献   
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