Changing rewards in contests: Has the three-point rule brought more offense to soccer?

In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule) may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular, we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively, and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams. Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis. First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001     

Multinational firms, international trade and international telecommunications

The study analyses the determinants of international telephone, telex, telegram and leased lines communication between the United States and 46 countries. It focusses on the role of multinational firms, international trading firms and new information technologies within the framework of the theory of transaction costs.Results of the econometric estimates suggest that: (a) technological conditions of telecommunication infrastructure, i.e., international diffusion lags of new information technologies, play an important role in the explanation of international telephone and telex telecommunication flows but not in the demand for telegraph and leased lines, (b) multinational firms use international telecommunication to reduce the coordination costs and are strong customers of leased lines and telephones, but less so of telex and telegrams, (c) international trading firms exhibit less clear preferences in the use of the different media to reduce transaction costs.     

Is globalization a road to duopoly?

In global markets, the market shares of the two or three biggest firms sum up more than 90 percent and firms do marketing efforts. However, the classical neo-walrasiano theoretical framework only is able to justify these stylized facts with particular firms’ cost structures, being one reason the presumption that there are no information costs. Towards the rationalization of those stylized facts, I study the evolution of the market structure in a model of price advertising with a variable that controls the degree of openness of regional markets. The main result of the model is that in equilibrium the structure of a global market is the duopoly.     

Perceptions of poverty attributions in Europe: a multilevel mixture model approach

The perception of the causes of poverty has long been recognized as a very important factor in the broader study of this social phenomenon. This study covers 15 European Union countries and considers three types of poverty attributions: individualistic, societal, and fatalistic. The individualistic view perception believes the poor are responsible for their situation, the societal perspective blames society for poverty and the fatalistic view considers poverty to be the result of bad luck or fate. A multilevel mixture model with three clusters of countries and six clusters of individuals was identified. Despite the generalization of the social explanations of poverty at the individual or micro level, there are also groups that emphasize more individualistic explanations, blaming the poor for their condition. At the country or macro level, the most developed cluster believes in the individualistic and fatalistic causes of poverty, whereas the least developed clusters explain poverty based on the injustices of society. There is diversity in the way these countries perceive poverty.     

Interplay between ethanol and electric vehicles as low carbon mobility options for passengers in the municipality of São Paulo

The Brazilian cities as well as many of the large urban centers in the world continue to expand, increasing the demand for mobility and transport, while, at the same time, the same cities are investing in greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation to avoid climate change. Brazil's urbanization rate increased from 26% in 1940 to almost 70% in 1980. During this period, the Brazilian population tripled and the urban population multiplied by seven. In 2010, the transport sector in São Paulo accounted for 71% of the total emissions released by the energy sector. Ethanol has been considered a fuel with less greenhouse gas emissions, when compared with fossil fuels. However, ethanol production would have to double to meet the expected demand. Electric vehicles (EVs) market is expanding around the world, and is also an option to reduce the transport emissions, if powered by clean electricity. To assess whether the adoption of EVs might bring more benefits than the current ethanol, we develop prospective scenarios supported by the Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning (LEAP) simulation tool, taking a bottom-up tank-to-wheel approach to consider the CO₂ emissions of car in São Paulo. The scenario considering a substitution of 25% of gasoline-powered cars by EV in 2030 showed a reduction in energy consumption and CO₂ emissions, around 15% and 26% respectively in that year in comparison with 2015. We discuss the interplay between ethanol and EV, also considering emission coefficients from life cycle analysis conducted in Brazil, and concluded EV will have higher positive impact on climate change mitigation than ethanol.     

Assessing Systemic Importance With a Fuzzy Logic Inference System

Three metrics are designed to assess Colombian financial institutions' size, connectedness and non-substitutability as the main drivers of systemic importance: (i) centrality as net borrower in the money market network; (ii) centrality as payments originator in the large-value payment system network; and (iii) asset value of core financial services. An aggregated systemic importance index is calculated based on expert knowledge by using a fuzzy logic inference system. We use principal component analysis to calculate a benchmark index for comparison purposes. Overall similarities between both indexes put forward that expert knowledge aggregation is consistent with that based on a purely quantitative standard approach. Specific non-negligible differences concur with the nonlinear features of an approach whose intention is to replicate human reasoning. Both indexes are complementary and provide a comprehensive relative assessment of each financial institution's systemic importance in the Colombian case, in which the choice of metrics pursues the macroprudential perspective of financial stability. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Inter‐jurisdictional Competition Engender a “Race to the Bottom”? A Meta‐Regression Analysis

A growing literature documents the existence of strategic political reactions to public expenditure between rival jurisdictions. These interactions can potentially create a downward expenditure spiral (“race to the bottom”) or a rising expenditure spiral (“race to the top”). However, in the course of identifying the existence of such interactions and ascertaining their underlying triggers, the empirical evidence has produced markedly heterogeneous findings. Most of this heterogeneity can be traced back to study design and institutional differences. This article contributes to the literature by applying meta‐regression analysis to quantify the magnitude of strategic inter‐jurisdictional expenditure interactions, controlling for study, and institutional characteristics. We find several robust results beyond confirming that jurisdictions do engage in strategic expenditure interactions, namely that strategic interactions: (i) are weakening over time, (ii) are stronger among municipalities than among higher levels of government, and (iii) appear to be more influenced from tax competition than yardstick competition, with capital controls and fiscal decentralization shaping the magnitude of fiscal interactions.