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Review of Accounting Studies - We document that the initiation of audit committee interlocks is associated with contagion in reported special items. We argue that this is, in part, attributable to...  相似文献   
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Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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Increasing regulatory pressures have created specialization within boards, with more requirements and responsibilities being refocused to the committee level. Using data from S&P 1,500 firms, we find that board committee overlap associated with linking pin directors (i.e., those serving simultaneously on the audit and compensation committees) is an important conduit for knowledge transfer between boards' monitoring and incentive alignment functions. These directors are associated with lower executive compensation and influence pay mix. In studying the dynamics behind this process, we find that newly created linking pins improve monitoring effectiveness whereas recently dissolved linking pins decrease it. We also find that linking pins are all the more important when managers make less conservative accounting choices. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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Journal of Business Ethics - Institutional investors, policy makers, and researchers have advocated for greater director independence in hopes of improving corporate governance and discouraging...  相似文献   
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Human resource practitioners and academics have increasingly realized the importance of corporate governance for firm human resource activities. This study investigates how one important form of corporate governance, namely, ownership within large, publicly traded firms, is associated with a firm's use of commitment human resource practices (CHRPs), specifically, the use of incentive compensation, profit sharing, and participative decision making. Our findings indicate that the types of large investor, namely, family and institutional, are differentially associated with the likelihood of the firm using these CHRPs. Specifically, family owners with their long‐term investment horizon, as well as their stakeholder orientation, increase the likelihood of the firm using these practices. In contrast, large institutional owners with their shorter‐term investment horizon, as well as their investor orientation, decrease the likelihood of the firm using these practices. Furthermore, among institutional investors, transient institutional investors are negatively associated with these practices, while dedicated institutional investors are not associated with these practices. Taken together, our results regarding the positive association of family ownership and this subset of CHRPs and the negative association of transient institutional investors and this set of practices, have important implications for human resource professionals who not only need to understand how ownership affects HR practices but also how to articulate the value of these investments in order to attract investors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.  相似文献   
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Using a corporate governance lens, this study considers owners with a stake in both the acquiring and the target firms in the context of mergers and acquisitions. A possible agency problem arises with regard to monitoring implications as managers may be able to take advantage of compromised monitoring because overlapping owners may focus on the aggregate value for both the acquiring and the target firms and nonoverlapping owners may be interested only in the acquirer's side of the deal. The results suggest that when more owners overlap in their ownership of both the acquiring and target firms, the acquiring firms are more likely to experience decreased shareholder value through merger and acquisition deals. This effect, however, can be constrained by stronger board control. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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