Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse

This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse. We calibrate a stylized principal‐agent model to the observed contracts of 595 CEOs and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations. We also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible payout for low outcomes. Finally, we identify the critical features of the loss‐aversion model that render optimal contracts convex.     

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS: THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS

The advent of novel psychotropic medications has revolutionized treatments for mental illnesses over the past few decades. Concurrently, changes in mental health coverage, particularly for Medicaid patients, created economic incentives for insurance carriers to shift costs and to encourage the use of psychotropic drugs. To quantify these effects, based on the framework in Griliches' seminal study on hybrid corn, we estimate logistic diffusion models using a longitudinal data set on Medicaid drug utilization. We find that financial incentives played a significant role in encouraging use of new medications that have lower physician specialty skill requirements. ( JEL O30, O33, I18, L14)     

An Investigation into the Major Causes 01 Australia's Recent Inflation and Some Policy Implications*

This paper investigates the major causes of Australia's recent inflation with special emphasis on the 1970s and early 1980s A general model of inflation is formulated based upon a vector auto-regression The main empirical finding is that increases in wages and import prices and more recently in money have been significant causal factors of Australia's inflationary experience. Government current expenditure is found to contribute passively to cost-push inflation     

Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay

We calibrate the standard principal–agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U.S. CEOs. We show that this model predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies; many would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies. These contracts would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility to CEOs. We conclude that the standard principal–agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts.     

Trading and Shareholder Democracy

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.