Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of REITs

We study ownership dynamics of multiple strategic risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. We show that, when insiders cannot commit,  ex ante , to an ownership policy, the aggregate insider stake gradually declines toward the competitive market allocation. Both the speed of adjustment and the long-term equilibrium aggregate insider ownership level are greater for companies with a larger number of insiders,  ceteris paribus . Using data from U.S. real estate investment trusts, we then test the model and find that the predictions of the model are verified empirically.     

How sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail energy prices?

There is growing evidence that the primary effect of energy price shocks on the U.S. economy involves a reduction in consumer spending. We quantify the direct effect on real consumption of unanticipated changes in discretionary income, shifts in precautionary savings, and changes in the operating cost of energy-using durables. The possibility of asymmetries in the response of real consumption to energy price shocks is also considered. We demonstrate that linear models are consistent with the symmetric behavior of real consumption in 1979 (when energy prices increased sharply) and in 1986 (when they fell sharply). It is shown that historically energy price shocks have been an important factor in explaining U.S. real consumption growth, but by no means the dominant factor.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.     

Global Financial Integration and Real Estate Security Returns

Have globalization and increasing economic and financial integration affected the rates of return of publicly traded real estate companies around the world? Using a set of multifactor models for annual data for 946 firms from 16 countries over the sample period, 1995–2002, we estimate the impact of a country's economic openness on returns of publicly traded real estate firms, controlling for the effects of global capital markets, domestic macroeconomic conditions and firm‐specific variables. We find that a country's real estate security excess (risk‐adjusted) returns are negatively related to its openness. The results are robust across different multifactor model specifications and are a testament to increasing global financial integration and its interplay with the real estate sector.     

Ownership Dynamics of REITs

This paper studies the effects that benefits of control and moral hazard have on the evolution of large stakes in REITs. A large risk-averse shareholder trades off the net benefits of REIT business monitoring and control with the cost of bearing risk beyond the level compensated by the REIT return premium. In equilibrium, the large shareholder gradually adjusts his ownership shares level (as long as his marginal benefits from holding shares increase in his REIT stake) towards the long-run competitive equilibrium in which his marginal share valuation coincides with that of the market. Because of the moral hazard, such level of ownership (and monitoring) is, in general, inefficient. The speed of adjustment is positively correlated with the agents risk aversion and company volatility, and negatively correlated with his marginal benefits of control and beneficial monitoring effects.     

How Do Institutional Factors Affect International Real Estate Returns?

Prior international real estate studies recognize the importance of country-specific factors for explaining real estate security returns. Using firm level observations from the FTSE NAREIT/EPRA Index for 2004?C2006, we construct a set of multifactor multivariate statistical regression models to identify and pin-point country-specific institutional features that determine differences for excess real estate security returns. Our analyses indicate that the excess real estate returns (i.e., required risk premiums) are, in part, determined by the quality of a country??s legal system and the corporate governance environment, controlling for various country-specific macro-economic variables and firm-level characteristics. We further find that the impact of institutional factors on international real estate returns is more prominent in the Asia-Pacific Region, and recent development of the REIT structure across the world does not alter the importance of corporate governance and legal system quality for determining real estate returns.     

Does credit rationing affect residential investment? Déjà vu all over again

This paper develops an empirical model to examine the impacts of credit rationing on residential investment for the 1960–1984 period. Our statistical results strongly support the position that noninterest rate variables affect mortgage activity and housing construction. Though we find a structural change in the housing construction and mortgage markets in the early 1980s, probably attributable to capital market integration and financial institutional deregulation, noninterest rate terms continue to matter. In other words, credit rationing continues to be an allocative device in the housing and mortgage markets.Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the Western Economic Association Conference, Los Angeles, June 1988; the Tenth Pacific Regional Science Conference, Pusan, Korea, July 1987; the AREUEA Annual Meetings New York City, December 1985; and the American Finance Association Annual Meetings, San Francisco, December 1983.     

House prices, wealth effects, and the Singapore macroeconomy

This paper examines the effect housing wealth has upon aggregate consumption in Singapore. While past research has focused only on changes in private housing wealth, the residential market in Singapore is dominated by the public housing sector. The massive public housing segment can generate potentially different wealth effects from standard private housing markets given the former’s unique institutional features. In particular, public housing owners who sell their units at market rates can repurchase a public flat at subsidized prices whereas private homeowners typically cannot. We estimate the link between consumption expenditure and both private and public housing wealth using a VARX approach for the Q1:1990–Q4:2002 period. We find that changes in private house prices have no significant effect on aggregate consumption. In contrast, public housing wealth effects are larger and more persistent.