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排序方式: 共有33条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.  相似文献   
2.
We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders?? interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms?? shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.  相似文献   
3.
We examine the interaction between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in a stewardship setting. Contracting includes multiple rounds of renegotiation based on contractible accounting information and non-contractible but more timely non-accounting information. We show that accounting regulation aimed at increasing earnings quality from a valuation perspective (earnings persistence) may have a significant impact on how firms rationally respond in terms of allowing accrual discretion in order to alleviate the impact on the stewardship role of earnings. Increasing the precision of more timely non-accounting information (analyst earnings forecasts) increases the ex ante value of the firm and reduces costly earnings management. There is an optimal level of reversible non-discretionary accrual noise introduced through revenue recognition policies. Tight rules-based accounting regulation, as opposed to leaving firms more choice over non-discretionary accrual policies, may lead firms to rationally respond by inducing costly earnings management. More generally, regulating both earnings persistence and the tightness of admissible auditing policies may not result in less equilibrium earnings management.  相似文献   
4.
Beatty, Petacchi, and Zhang investigate the role of two hedge commitment mechanisms??interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism??in reducing agency costs of debt. Using a large sample of syndicated loan agreements, they provide evidence that borrowers required to hedge interest rate risk through interest rate protection covenants receive lower interest rate charges. However, borrowers who voluntarily hedge interest rate risks receive lower rates only if they implement conservative financial reporting. The authors conclude that the benefits of hedging are realized only when borrowers can credibly commit to maintain hedge positions once a syndicated loan is issued. While the evidence provided by the authors is novel and interesting, I argue that the empirical assessment of hedge benefits is more complex. In addition, there are still some important open issues left unanswered that could be tackled by future research.  相似文献   
5.
In single-equation tests, real exchange rates show mean reversion for nine of 10 Central and Eastern European transition countries for the period January 1993 to December 2005. Because of the shift from controlled to market economies and accompanying crises, failed policy regimes and changes in exchange rate regimes, unit root tests for transition countries often require allowance for structural changes. Accounting for structural breaks gives substantially faster mean-reversion speeds than those found for major industrialized countries. These fast adjustment speeds are plausible: Transition countries had perhaps 10 years to make unprecedented adjustments required for accession to the European Union. A number of papers have applied non-linear models to the Central and Eastern European countries. This paper investigates four non-linear models and compares them with piece-wise linear break models. The break models appear superior in detecting mean reversion for the Central and Eastern European transition countries.  相似文献   
6.
How does trust evolve in markets? What is the optimal level of regulation and how does this affect trust formation and economic growth? In a theoretical model, we analyze these questions, given the value of social capital and the potential for growth in the market. When social capital is valuable, regulation and trustfulness are substitutes. In this case, regulation may cause lower aggregate investment and decreased economic growth. When the social capital is less valuable, regulation and trustfulness may be complements. In the paper, we analyze the optimal level of regulation and highlight the novel predictions of the model.  相似文献   
7.
This paper examines multi-period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated. Short-term contracts in long-term employment relationships are equivalent to a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. The dynamic of incentive rates is determined by (i) how and in which periods managerial effort affects the contractible performance measures; and by (ii) the time-series correlation of error terms in performance reports. The model explains why long-term investments can decrease while incentive rates increase as managers approach retirement. Earnings persistence is negatively associated to earnings-based incentive rates but, towards retirement, high earnings persistence implies increasing earnings-based incentive rates.  相似文献   
8.
Abstract:  We investigate the effects of the introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) on the market's valuation of foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) documents that investors discount the value of foreign earnings for US multinational companies. He conjectures but does not test the possibility that this finding is due to poor disclosure related to foreign operations. We find strong evidence that the introduction of the standard is positively associated with the pricing of foreign earnings. In addition, we use both the Mishkin (1983) test and a zero-investment hedge portfolio test and find that investors' mispricing of foreign earnings lessens (and in fact disappears) after SFAS 131. This study is one of the first attempts to show that improved disclosure reduces mispricing.  相似文献   
9.
We demonstrate analytically and empirically that valuing a firm with foreign operations in the presence of exchange rate uncertainty requires information on the foreign operating cash flows disaggregated by currency and persistence. In particular, given consolidated earnings, investors need information on the exchange gain or loss on permanent foreign operating cash flows. We extend the model to show how the permanent foreign cash flows can be used to condition the change in the translation adjustment to make it value‐relevant; however, using the permanent foreign cash flows directly is superior for valuation purposes. The empirical tests support our hypothesis that the market response to exchange rate movements is sensitive to the relative magnitudes of revenues and costs denominated in each foreign currency in which a firm has transactions. Disclosure of cash flows by currency should enhance the valuation of firms with foreign operations.  相似文献   
10.
This paper studies the control problem of a stochastic monetary system. The Central Bank has the choice of two targets: the size of its portfolio of assets or the level of interest rate on that class of assets. If its objective is to minimize the variance of a monetary aggregate or of private sector interest rate, the conditions under which one or the other of the targets should be used are analyzed. However, if the ultimate objective is a minimum variance in a desired GNP level the effect of the immediate target is the same whether the central bank employs a money stock or a private interest rate target.  相似文献   
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