Do casinos pay their customers to become risk-averse? Revising the house money effect in a field experiment

The house money effect predicts that individuals show increased risk-seeking behavior in the presence of prior windfall gains. Although the effect’s existence is widely accepted, experimental studies that compare individuals’ risk-taking behavior using house money to individuals’ risk-taking behavior using their own money produce contradictory results. This experimental field study analyzes the gambling behavior of 917 casino customers who face real losses. We find that customers who received free play at the entrance showed not higher but significantly lower levels of risk-taking behavior during their casino visit, expressed through lower average wagers. This study thus provides field evidence against the house money effect. Moreover, as a result of lower levels of risk seeking, endowed customers yield better economic results in the form of smaller own-money losses when leaving the casino.     

EXPLAINING THE SPREAD OF TEMPORARY JOBS AND ITS IMPACT ON LABOR TURNOVER

This article provides a simple model that explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into permanent and temporary jobs observed in Continental European countries. We find that job protection has very small effects on total employment but induces large substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs, which significantly reduces aggregate production.     

Will export taxes replace VERs?

Some economists use an export tax, which alters the domestic relative price of exports, to model a voluntary export restraint, which is a restriction on the quantity of exports with restriction-induced rents accruing to the exporting country. Implicit in this approach is the presumption that the two policies are equivalent. In a very general model that allows for a finite number of goods and factors and intermediated goods and joint production, we demonstrate that, in general, this is, in fact, not the case. Specifically, from the exporting country’s perspective, the real income effects of the two policies are nonequivalent.     

Markets as communication systems

As the information relative to endowments, costs and preferences is dispersed among many agents, the quality of resource allocation depends on the ability of markets to communicate information inside the economic system. Because information is transferred through negotiation and transaction behaviors, the network of trading relations defines the channels through which it flows. In the present study, we use new computational tools to analyze the performance of two wholesale trade institutions widely used around the world: network trading and marketplace trading. Whilst network trading and marketplace trading disseminate far fewer bits of information than a perfectly transparent benchmark market, they often manage to generate an allocation of resources that is almost as good. In many cases, network trading proves more effective than marketplace trading (contrary to a common preconception). This surprising performance of network trading is linked to a form of indirect arbitrage induced by connections between networks. Implications for market design and public policy making are presented, along with prospects for further research.     

The true shadow price of foreign exchange

For the last half century, trade theorists, development economists, and development practitioners have been calculating what was claimed to be the shadow price of scarce foreign exchange. In fact, what they have been calculating is the social value of the receipt of a unit of a numeraire good from abroad, typically obtained from real models. In our paper, we explicitly deal with a model of a monetized economy, and we develop formulas for the social value of a unit of foreign currency, which, in general, differ from the traditional formulas.     

Why did a majority of French voters reject the European Constitution?

This article assesses the reasons that led a majority of French voters to reject the 29 October 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Their reasons are less connected with the Treaty itself than with a fear of loss of national sovereignty, immigration, and relocation of firms to European countries where the workforce is cheaper.