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This study investigates the effects of internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the choice
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and the value of firms engaging in CSR activities. The study finds the
CSR choice is positively associated with the internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, including
board leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and anti- takeover provisions, after controlling
for various firm characteristics. After correcting for endogeneity and simultaneity issues, the results show that CSR engagement
positively influences firm value measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s q. We find that the impact of analyst following for
firms that engage in CSR on firm value is strongly positive, while the board leadership, board independence, blockholders’
ownership, and institutional ownership play a relatively weaker role in enhancing firm value. Furthermore, we find that CSR
activities that address internal social enhancement within the firm, such as employees diversity, firm relationship with its
employees, and product quality, enhance the value of firm more than other CSR subcategories for broader external social enhancement
such as community relation and environmental concerns. 相似文献
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Maretno Agus Harjoto 《Journal of Education for Business》2017,92(3):129-137
The author compared students' perceptions of prelecture videos replacing face-to-face (F2F) classes in blended and F2F graduate corporate finance classes. Using 176 anonymous survey responses from eight F2F and two blended classes during the 2014–2016 year, the author found that students in the blended classes had a greater belief that prelecture videos could replace F2F classes than did students in the F2F classes. Students in the blended classes showed a greater understanding of the flipped lecture format and performed better than students in the F2F classes. Students in the blended classes also tended to rate the instructor's teaching effectiveness lower than students in the F2F classes. 相似文献
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We hypothesize that CSR serves as a control mechanism to reduce deviations from optimal risk taking, and therefore, CSR curbs excessive risk taking and reduces excessive risk avoidance. Based on the stakeholder theory, firms with CSR focus must balance the interests of multiple stakeholders, and therefore, managers must allocate resources to satisfy both investing and non-investing stakeholders’ interests. Using five measures of corporate risk taking and a sample of 1718 US firms during 1998 to 2011, we find that stronger CSR performance is associated with smaller deviations from optimal risk taking levels. We examine the mechanism through which CSR has an impact on firm value and find a positive indirect impact of CSR on firm value through the impact of CSR on risk taking. CSR performance is positively associated with firm value because CSR reduces excessive risk taking and risk avoidance. 相似文献
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This paper studies the relationship between personal stock donation by top executives and board of directors (insiders) of publicly traded corporations and their personal tax, shareholders' returns, and social responsibility. The study finds evidence that the timing of stock donations is driven by personal tax gain. The study further shows, comparing stock gift corporations relative to their non‐stock gift cohorts, that personal stock gifts are associated with lower short‐term and long‐term stock returns to shareholders. This implies that stock donation driven by insiders' personal gain adversely affects shareholder wealth. However, the likelihood and intensity of insiders to make personal stock donation is reduced when firms have strong corporate social responsibility (CSR). Agency theory explains insiders' opportunistic behavior, stakeholder theory is also supported by evidence that stock donation is negatively related to CSR, and stewardship theory offers a different view to explain the rationale behind insiders' stock donation and shareholders' reactions to stock gifts. 相似文献
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Maretno A. Harjoto Ha-Chin Yi Tosporn Chotigeat 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2012,36(3):587-612
This study focuses on the reasons for and the implications of banks?? decisions to acquire non-bank financial service firms (non-banks). The choice to acquire non-banks is driven by both external forces such as deregulation and regulatory capital and by internal forces such as a diversification strategy and efforts to enhance revenue and return to equity holders. We find that whereas the impact of acquiring non-banks increases their non-interest income, it also increases their non-interest expense. The net effect of choosing non-bank acquisitions lowers their subsequent return on assets, market value, and stock returns, as well as increasing their risk. However, the non-bank acquisitions do significantly increase the acquiring banks top executives?? subsequent compensation. We conclude that non-bank acquisitions are driven by both regulatory and strategic forces within the banking industry. However, such acquisitions manifest into agency problems. 相似文献
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Maretno Agus Harjoto 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2017,49(2):487-513
We examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms’ degrees of operating (DOL) and financial leverage (DFL). Combining the enlightened value maximizing and capital structure theories, we hypothesize that CSR as firms’ strategic choice to internalize the cost from implicit contracts between the firms and their non-investing stakeholders affects firms’ operating and financial leverage. We find empirical evidence that CSR and CSR strengths are positively (negatively) related to firms’ DOL (DFL). CSR concerns are positively related firms’ DOL and DFL. We also document that CSR is positively related to firms’ operating cost and we find evidence that CSR acts as a substitute for corporate debt tax shield when firms’ financial leverage is low. 相似文献
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We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts. 相似文献
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We reject the hypothesis that investment and commercial banks have identical loan-pricing policies. We find that compared to commercial banks, investment banks lend to less profitable, more lever aged firms, price riskier classes of term loans more generously, and offer relatively longer-term credits, usually with term, not commitment contracts. Investment banks typically establish higher credit spreads, although the premium declines when a commercial bank joins as syndicate co-arranger. Investment banks also price riskier classes of term loans more generously to borrowers than do commercial banks. Commercial-bank funding advantages do not appear to be a source of the pricing differences. 相似文献