Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market

We document that contractual disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages contained false information about the borrower's housing equity in 7–14% of loans. The rate of misrepresented loan default was 70% higher than for similar loans. These misrepresentations likely occurred late in the intermediation and exist among securities sold by all reputable intermediaries. Investors—including large institutions—holding securities with misrepresented collateral suffered severe losses due to loan defaults, price declines, and ratings downgrades. Pools with misrepresentations were not issued at a discount. Misrepresentation on another easy‐to‐quantify dimension shows that these effects are a conservative lower bound.     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: DOES TRUST MATTER?

Ecosystem service provision in agriculture may require cooperation between farmers. Trust fosters cooperation in many economic and social interactions and is important to the success of traditional agricultural cooperatives. Little is known about how trust affects farmers’ willingness to cooperate to provide an ecosystem service, what types of trust are most important, and under what conditions trust may matter. In this study, we present results of a survey of Missouri crop farmers exploring the role trust plays in farmers’ stated willingness to cooperate to control pests. We find that most farmers say they are willing to cooperate, and most farmers are willing to trust others. However, we find little evidence that trust positively influences farmers’ willingness to cooperate to control pests. Instead, we find that trust may only matter under certain conditions, such as when participants’ farms are dissimilar, and that other determinants, such as the perceived benefit of cooperation and environmental concern, are more important than trust to farmers who are contemplating cooperation to control pests.     

Credit Rationing,Income Exaggeration,and Adverse Selection in the Mortgage Market

We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with “low‐doc” mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to. We provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income. Our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low‐doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self‐employed borrowers.     

Legitimating Inequality: Fooling Most of the People All of the Time

Over the three decades leading up to the crisis of 2008, inequality dramatically increased in the United States and Great Britain. What stands out, but is seldom noted, is that this occurred within democracies where the relative losers—the overwhelming majority—could in principle have used the political system to block or reverse rising inequality. Why did they not do so? A glance at history reveals that peoples have only very infrequently contested inequality because they were led to believe that their inferior status in terms of income, wealth, and privilege was just, that it was not really so bad, or that it was necessary for their future well‐being. Ideological systems legitimated a status quo of inequality, or in more modern times even increasing inequality. This article surveys the manner in which inequality has been historically legitimated, first predominantly by religion, then predominately by economic thought. Attention is then focused on the manner in which contemporary economic science and its popular interpretations in the media have served to legitimate inequality in the U.S. since the mid‐1970s. The article concludes with a reflection on the unique conditions that enable the legitimation of inequality to be delegitimated.     

SAVINGS MOBILIZATION,FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LIBERALIZATION: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA

This paper attempts to identify the key factors behind Malaysia's remarkable savings performance. Drawing on the life cycle theory, the saving function is estimated by incorporating other relevant structural features and institutional settings of the Malaysian economy into the specification. Particular emphasis has been placed on the roles of financial factors in mobilizing funds in the private sector. The results suggest that financial deepening and increased banking density tend to encourage private savings. Development of insurance markets and liberalization of the financial system, however, tend to exert a dampening effect on private savings.     

Prices Paid in Grocery Markets: Searching Across Stores and Brands

Using a large sample of prices paid for 21 homogeneous grocery products available in several brands in each of 16 markets, we simulate the search behavior of a consumer following different shopping strategies using as many as four supermarkets. We find that price search can lead to substantial savings. Brand switching can generate savings at least as large as visiting multiple stores to find the lowest price for a single brand. Buying a private label is usually a better way to save than any amount of search for low prices on national brands. A case study in a small metropolitan area grocery market yields results substantially the same as the simulation results.     

When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts’ Incentives

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts’ incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.