RATE‐CUTTING TAX REFORMS AND CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE

While there is a large and growing number of studies on the determinants of corporate tax rates, the literature has so far ignored the fact that the behavior of governments in setting tax rates is often best described as a discrete choice decision problem. We set up an empirical model that relates a government's decision whether to cut its corporate tax rate to the country's own inherited tax and taxes in neighboring countries. Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in Europe since 1980, we find evidence suggesting that the position in terms of the tax burden imposed on corporate income relative to geographical neighbors strongly affects the probability of rate‐cutting tax reforms. Countries are particularly likely to cut their statutory tax rate if the inherited tax is high and if they are exposed to low‐tax neighbors.     

The Impact of Collateralization on Swap Rates

Interest rate swap pricing theory traditionally views swaps as a portfolio of forward contracts with net swap payments discounted at LIBOR rates. In practice, the use of marking‐to‐market and collateralization questions this view as they introduce intermediate cash flows and alter credit characteristics. We provide a swap valuation theory under marking‐to‐market and costly collateral and examine the theory's empirical implications. We find evidence consistent with costly collateral using two different approaches; the first uses single‐factor models and Eurodollar futures prices, and the second uses a formal term structure model and Treasury/swap data.     

Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders

We study an infinitely repeated first-price auction with common values. We focus on one-sided incomplete information, in which one bidder learns the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning by the uninformed bidder occurs only through observation of the bids. The proprietary information is eventually revealed, and the seller extracts essentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players' pay-offs tend to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information and argue that, under a Markovian refinement, the outcome is pooling as information is revealed only insofar as it does not affect prices.     

Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Systemic Banks' Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Securities Register

We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach-for-yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private-sector (financial and nonfinancial) securities and dollar-denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans.     

AN APPLICATION OF SEQUENTIAL REGRESSION MULTIPLE IMPUTATION ON PANEL DATA

The relatively new sequential regression multiple imputation (SRMI) method is introduced, with the process of SRMI laid out in detail. The Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development and the follow‐up KwaZulu‐Natal Income Dynamics Study provide the real panel data on which the methods reviewed are applied. The SRMI process is used to create multiple datasets completed with values imputed for data originally missing, and using the error component model estimation procedures and Rubin's rules, inferences on the panel data are made. Conclusions are drawn as to the applicability of the SRMI process to these data and as to the results of the regression analyses completed.     

Variations in Market Liquidity and the Intraday Interest Rate

Most central banks offer banks participating in large‐value real‐time gross settlement (RTGS) systems a free intraday overdraft facility to discourage banks from actively managing their daylight liquidity. In this paper, we ask whether this facility has kept the intraday interest rate at zero. Using a unique transaction‐level data set on collateralized interbank loans for 2006–12, we find that during periods of financial distress, rates for morning transactions are higher than those in the afternoon. Moreover, this intraday rate correlates with market liquidity, suggesting that rates contain a liquidity premium. This intraday pattern is reduced, but not eliminated by the Eurosystem's accommodative liquidity provision.     

PRICE ELASTICITIES AND PRICING POWER IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE CASE OF PETROCHEMICAL‐DERIVED PLASTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA1

This paper examines whether there necessarily exists a conflict between allocative and productive efficiency in small open economy markets. That productive efficiency favours market concentration is not in dispute, and the sole question we face is whether allocative efficiency suffers under high market concentration. We proceed theoretically and econometrically. We find that the conflict between productive and allocative efficiency is not necessarily as stringent as the international competition policy literature suggests should be the case. In particular, we note that the strategic interaction between the large domestic producer and its competitors makes feasible a range of alternative price elasticities of demand, and empirically that all price elasticities of demand are less than or equal to unity. Nevertheless, the impact of market structure is such as to render feasible a wide range of possible levels of pricing power.     

Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information

The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to one's type and can therefore influence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if effort is observable, this can induce a ratchet effect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little effort in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that they are of little ability. The effect reduces overall effort and increases equilibrium utility of the contestants when compared with two unrelated one-shot contests. It does, however, also introduce an allocative inefficiency since sometimes a contestant with a low valuation wins. The model assumes an imperfectly discriminating contest. In an extension I show that, qualitatively, results are similar in a perfectly discriminating contest (all pay auction).