To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation

Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within‐country variation that decreases with the strength of investors' legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure. Using firm‐level governance and transparency data from 27 countries, we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices, and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All relations are stronger in less investor‐friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.     

What Shapes Assessment of Ability to Pay for Children's College Education?

Many parents have concerns about the cost of their child's college and lack information about preparing for those expenses. Parents' assessment of ability to pay for college are likely to influence their investments in a child's education, and may in turn affect the child's educational commitment and attainment. These potential outcomes lead us to investigate what accounts for parents' assessment. We use logistic regression to analyze data collected from mothers with newborn children (N = 2,566). The findings demonstrate that the mother's assessment of ability to pay for the child's education are significantly associated with material hardship experiences, financial management skills, educational expectations, and her education level. We discuss research and policy implications of promoting positive financial assessment for college early.     

ESTIMATING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY WITHOUT RESTRICTIVE ASSUMPTIONS

This study eliminates the effects of markup, returns to scale, and capital utilization from the Solow residual (SR) for Korea to derive an alternative measure for productivity. Empirical results show that markup generates significant bias in the SR, and that the alternative productivity measure is greater than the residual. Furthermore, money supply Granger‐causes the SR but does not Granger‐cause the alternative measure, suggesting that the new productivity measure is consistent with the neutrality of money. The results contradict the presumption that the SR with variable capital utilization represents true technology shocks because it is orthogonal to demand shocks.(JEL C32, E32, O47)     

Disappearing Dividends: Implications for the Dividend–Price Ratio and Return Predictability

The conventional dividend–price ratio is highly persistent, and the literature reports mixed evidence on its role in predicting stock returns. We argue that the decreasing number of firms with a traditional dividend‐payout policy is responsible for these results, and develop a model in which the long‐run relationship between the dividends and stock price is time varying. An adjusted dividend–price ratio that accounts for the time‐varying long‐run relationship is considerably less persistent. Furthermore, the predictive regression model that employs the adjusted dividend–price ratio as a regressor outperforms the random‐walk model. These results are robust with respect to the firm size.     

Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives

This paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over- and under-investment incentives associated with risky debt. We show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under-investment but increases over-investment, and vice versa. Under symmetric information, the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets (i.e., project financing). Under asymmetric information, the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project's cash flow in the same rate. If this is not possible, the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large. With regard to dividend convenants, we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments. When they are unconditioned, allowing more dividends increases the under-investment incentive. In contrast, conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over-investment incentive.     

Debt and Input Misallocation

We investigate a class of agency costs of debt that arise because debt financing affects the firm's incentives to use inputs efficiently. A methodology for estimating this class of costs is presented and applied to a major industry, air transport. Our results are consistent with agency models that predict a decrease in efficiency as the debt increases. A part of the loss of efficiency that we identify is attributable to the greater use by levered firms of inputs that can be monitored and are collateralizable.