Endogenizing leadership in tax competition

In this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late, i.e. to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage. We highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second-mover advantage. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem. In order to solve this issue, we consider a quadratic specification of the production function, and we use two criteria of selection: Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance. We emphasize that at the risk-dominant equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second-mover advantage. If asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance in selecting the same SPE. Three results may be deduced from our analysis: (i) the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted; (ii) the smaller jurisdiction leads; (iii) the ‘big-country-higher-tax-rate’ rule does not always hold.     

The Effect of Socially Responsible Investing on Portfolio Performance

More and more investors apply socially responsible screens when building their stock portfolios. This raises the question whether these investors can increase their performance by incorporating such screens into their investment process. To answer this question we implement a simple trading strategy based on socially responsible ratings from the KLD Research & Analytics: Buy stocks with high socially responsible ratings and sell stocks with low socially responsible ratings. We find that this strategy leads to high abnormal returns of up to 8.7% per year. The maximum abnormal returns are reached when investors employ the best‐in‐class screening approach, use a combination of several socially responsible screens at the same time, and restrict themselves to stocks with extreme socially responsible ratings. The abnormal returns remain significant even after taking into account reasonable transaction costs.     

Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union

This paper studies alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary union. Wages are fixed by trade unions for two periods, either at the national or at the monetary union level. It is shown that the best solution with regard to unemployment depends on the nature of externalities and dynamic strategic interactions between the monetary union's countries; namely on the degree of openness of the monetary union, and the differentiation index between national goods.     

IS IT IS OR IS IT AIN'T MY OBLIGATION? REGIONAL DEBT IN A FISCAL FEDERATION*

This article studies the repayment of regional debt in a multiregion economy with a central authority: Who pays the obligation issued by a region? With commitment, the central government will use its economy‐wide taxation power in support of its objective to smooth distortionary taxes and consumption across regions. Absent commitment, this tool of the central government may be exploited to induce it to bail out regional government deficits. We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications. In particular, we show when the gains from a federation may outweigh the welfare costs of a bailout. We use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations: the United States, the European Union, and Argentina.     

When do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union?

This paper offers a framework to study strategic interactions between private players, national fiscal authorities and a common central bank in monetary unions. We establish general conditions, in terms of restrictions on spillover effects of actions by private and public players, under which games that differ in the degree of cooperation and commitment can admit the same equilibrium outcome. We use these conditions to characterize benchmark results on the irrelevance of cooperation and commitment established in recent literature. Moreover, we show for a general setting, in which the benchmark results do not apply, that gains from fiscal cooperation depend on the number of countries and increase as this number gets larger.     

The term structure of illiquidity premia

We investigate the term structure of bond market illiquidity premia and show that the term structure varies greatly over time. Short and long end are strictly separated suggesting that different economic factors drive different parts of the term structure. We propose a stylized theoretical model which implies that current trading needs of investors determine the short end. The long-term risk of being forced to liquidate bond positions determines the long end. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. While short-term liquidation risk captured by asset market volatilities drives the short end, the long end depends on the long-term economic outlook.     

Commitment and the adoption of a common currency*

In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto‐dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.     

LIQUIDITY COMMONALITY BEYOND BEST PRICES

Previous market microstructure research focuses on commonality in liquidity at the inside spread. However, liquidity at the inside spread only determines the systematic liquidity risk of small and medium trades. We study commonality in displayed liquidity beyond best prices, which determines the systematic liquidity risk of large trades. We show that it is much larger than commonality at the inside spread. The deeper we look into the order book, the higher is the level of commonality. In addition, it rises in the morning and when markets fall.