Can Shareholders Be at Rest after Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

Using a propensity score matched sample and a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that stock price crash risk increases after a firm voluntarily incorporates clawback provisions in executive officers' compensation contracts. This heightened crash risk is concentrated in adopters that increase upward real activities‐based earnings management and those that reduce the readability of 10‐K reports. Based on cross‐sectional analyses, we also find that the increased crash risk is more pronounced for adopters with high ex ante fraud risk, low‐ability managers, high CEO equity incentives, and low dedicated institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that the clawback adoption per se does not curb managerial opportunism but rather induces managers to use alternative channels for concealing bad news, which may contribute to a greater stock price crash risk; and the increase in crash risk is more likely in cases where incentives are strong or monitoring is weak. Our results should be of interest to regulators and policymakers considering the effects of clawback adoption on the investing public.     

E-negotiation System Development: Using Negotiation Protocols to Manage Software Components

A major challenge in developing an e-negotiation system (ENS) is that the system should fit into the context which varies with negotiation cases. To mitigate context dependency, we propose to separate e-negotiation protocols from ENS and adopt a component-oriented approach. In this paper, we present a framework for e-negotiation protocols that implements this approach. The framework has been tested by developing several ENSs of which two had been tested in laboratory negotiation experiments with more than 100 participants.     

THE 2007–2008 U.S. RECESSION: WHAT DID THE REAL‐TIME GOOGLE TRENDS DATA TELL THE UNITED STATES?

In the extant literature of business cycle predictions, the signals for business cycle turning points are generally issued with a lag of at least 5 months. In this paper, we make use of a novel and timely indicator—the Google search volume data—to help to improve the timeliness of business cycle turning point identification. We identify multiple query terms to capture the real‐time public concern on the aggregate economy, the credit market, and the labor market condition. We incorporate the query indices in a Markov‐switching framework and successfully “nowcast” the peak date within a month that the turning occurred. (JEL E37, G17)     

EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS UNDER CORRELATED REVENUE AND EXCHANGE RATE RISK

This paper examines the behaviour of a competitive exporting firm under joint revenue and exchange rate risk. The firm can trade unbiased currency futures contracts for hedging purposes. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full‐hedging theorem holds when the revenue shock prevails. If the correlation between the revenue shock and the random spot exchange rate is non‐positive, the firm optimally produces less than the benchmark level when the revenue shock is absent. If, in addition, the firm is prudent, the optimal futures position is an under‐hedge. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions under which the firm's optimal output level is higher in the presence than in the absence of the revenue shock. Operational hedging and financial hedging as such interact in a complicated way to better cope with the multiple sources of uncertainty faced by the firm.     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

A generalized algebraic model for optimizing inventory decisions in a centralized or decentralized multi-stage multi-firm supply chain

First of all, a number of integrated models with/without lot streaming under the integer multiplier coordination mechanism is generalized by allowing lot streaming and three types of inspection for some/all upstream firms. Secondly, the optimal solutions to the three- and four-stage models are individually derived, both using the perfect squares method, which is a simple algebraic approach so that ordinary readers unfamiliar with differential calculus can easily understand how to obtain the optimal solution procedures. Thirdly, optimal expressions for some well-known models are deduced. Fourthly, expressions for sharing the coordination benefits based on Goyal’s (1976) scheme are derived, and a further sharing scheme is introduced. Fifthly, two numerical examples for illustrative purposes are presented. Finally, some future research works involving extension or modification of the generalized model are suggested.     

A technical note on “Optimizing inventory decisions in a multi-stage multi-customer supply chain”

We first generalize Khouja [Khouja, M., 2003. Optimizing inventory decisions in a multi-stage multi-customer supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 39 (3), 193–208] integrated model considering the integer multipliers mechanism and next individually derive the optimal solution to the three- and four-stage model using the perfect squares method, which is a simple algebraic approach so that ordinary readers unfamiliar with differential calculus can understand the optimal solution procedure with ease. We subsequently deduce the optimal expressions for Khouja (2003) and Cárdenas-Barrón [Cárdenas-Barrón, L.E., 2007. Optimal inventory decisions in a multi-stage multi-customer supply chain: a note. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 43 (5), 647–654] model, and identify the associated errors in Khouja (2003). We present two numerical examples for illustrative purposes. We finally shed light on some future research by extending or modifying the generalized model.     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).