How Does the Largest Shareholder Affect Dividends?

Focusing on the legal protection of minority shareholders in Japan, which suggests that manager‐owned firms are better governed than corporation‐owned firms, this study presents a new test of two dividend models: the substitute model and the outcome model. In support of the latter, I find that manager‐owned firms pay higher dividends than corporation‐owned firms. The paper also examines the association between ownership by the largest shareholder and dividend payments. I find an inverted U‐shaped relationship for manager‐owned firms and a U‐shaped relationship for corporation‐owned firms between them. These results can be explained by the benefits and drawbacks of concentrated ownership.     

Some aspects on regional integration,comparative advantage and consumer's diversity

This article describes one simple Cournot oligopoly model with linear inverse demand and international linkage, and tries to analyse how the degree of competitiveness, the diversity in comparative advantage, consumer preference and market volume are closely interrelated with each other in the course of free trade areas (FTA) liberalization. The influence of income/substitution effects to firm's profit maximization is also examined. My analysis shows some basic results and implications regarding the tariff-setting strategies and the incentive for endogenous internal liberalization, as well as the role of FTA formation on a stream to world-wide liberalization.     

Generalizations of Ho–Lee’s binomial interest rate model I: from one- to multi-factor

In this paper a multi-factor generalization of Ho–Lee model is proposed. In sharp contrast to the classical Ho–Lee, this generalization allows for those movements other than parallel shifts, while it still is described by a recombining tree, and is a process with stationary independent increments to be compatible with principal component analysis. Based on the model, generalizations of duration-based hedging are proposed. A continuous-time limit of the model is also discussed. This research was supported by Open Research Center Project for Private Universities: matching fund subsidy from MEXT, 2004–2008 and also by Grants-in-Aids for Scientific Research (No. 18540146) from the Japan Society for Promotion of Sciences.     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Conditions for short-run stability of a small open economy under flexible exchange rates

Short-run stability of a small open economy under flexible exchange rate regimes is shown to involve joint conditions on the rates of the growth of the public debt and of the current account surplus.     

On patterns of dynamic interdependence in a two-country world under flexible exchange rates

A two-country general equilibrium model of the world, where the interest-rate parity and the purchasing power parity conditions hold, is used to demonstrate how the two economies become interdependent through expectational mechanisms, and the government budgets being not in balance.     

Optimal money supply in models with endogenous discount factor

This paper studies the Friedman rule for the optimal quantity of money in money in the utility (MIU) and cash–credit models while considering two specifications for the endogenous discount factor. In the first specification, the discount factor depends directly on the utility level. In the second, the discount factor depends on every component of the utility function. We show that under the former specification the Friedman rule is the optimal policy. Under the latter, however, while the Friedman rule is optimal for the MIU model, it is not optimal for the cash–credit model.