全文获取类型
收费全文 | 93篇 |
免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 66篇 |
计划管理 | 17篇 |
经济学 | 2篇 |
贸易经济 | 2篇 |
经济概况 | 7篇 |
出版年
2019年 | 1篇 |
2017年 | 1篇 |
2015年 | 1篇 |
2014年 | 3篇 |
2013年 | 5篇 |
2012年 | 5篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 2篇 |
2008年 | 5篇 |
2007年 | 5篇 |
2006年 | 4篇 |
2005年 | 3篇 |
2004年 | 3篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 3篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
2000年 | 6篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 4篇 |
1995年 | 5篇 |
1994年 | 5篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 3篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 2篇 |
1981年 | 3篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有94条查询结果,搜索用时 156 毫秒
1.
Using a sample of asset sell‐off transactions from January 1990 to April 2010, we find that the method of payment used in asset sell‐off transactions is associated with several characteristics cited in the acquisitions research that reflect cash constraints of the bidder. Specifically, bidders facing more stringent cash constraints are more likely to use equity when purchasing assets, while sellers subjected to cash constraints prefer cash when selling assets. Second, we find that the variation in method of payment among asset sell‐off transactions also is partially explained by variables representing asymmetric information. Third, we apply our model to an expanded sample that includes non‐U.S. sellers of assets and find that an equity payment is more likely when sellers are based in countries that have relatively high country risk (more government restrictions), weak shareholder rights, and a weak legal system. Thus, it appears that bidders prefer that sellers share in the risk of the transaction under these conditions. 相似文献
2.
Oneil Harris Jeff Madura Charmaine Glegg 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2010,50(2):180-190
Consistent with agency theory, we find that bidder managers make takeover financing decisions in ways that circumvent more effective monitors. Bidder managers are more likely to use cash rather than stock when targets have aggressive outside blockholders. We also find that the likelihood of a cash offer decreases when aggressive outside bidder block ownership is relatively low. However, the likelihood of a cash offer increases when aggressive outside bidder blockholding is in the intermediate range, a range of ownership where their continued influence over managerial decisions is threatened by a stock offer. Furthermore, we find that bidder management tends to use cash when its outside bidder blockholders are less aggressive. Overall, our findings indicate that managerial decisions on financing takeovers are motivated to prevent aggressive outside blockholders from gaining more control. 相似文献
3.
We find that information leakages prior to public guidance issued by company management exist even after Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), and are more pronounced when characteristics of the firm, the guidance, or the industry reflect higher levels of information asymmetry. Since public guidance is only partially leaked, this information leakage can be used to anticipate the information content of the impending public guidance. We simulate a trading strategy based on the preguidance leakage in the period after Regulation FD, which suggests that information leakage is an effective signal of the information content within impending public guidance. 相似文献
4.
Inga Chira Luis García-Feijóo Jeff Madura 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2017,49(2):515-543
We study the influence of market signals and agency problems on the decision to cancel an announced acquisition. We find major differences between deals involving private vs. public targets. First, controlling for the value of expected synergies, acquisitions are less likely to be cancelled when the target is private rather than public. This finding supports learning rather than the alternative common-information hypothesis. Second, better manager-shareholder interest alignment makes the cancellation of a “bad” deal more likely only when the target is a private firm. This suggests bidder agency problems have a greater influence on acquisition outcome (i.e., learning) when the target is private. Third, cancellation is more likely for private targets when their post-announcement abnormal returns are low, especially if the method of payment includes stock. This indicates that it is important to control for bidder overvaluation when testing the managerial learning hypothesis. Overall, both the learning and agency hypotheses help explain observed differences in deal completion by target type. 相似文献
5.
Jeff Madura Thanh Ngo Ariel M. Viale 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2012,52(1):49-62
We identify time-varying industry and macroeconomic factors that explain the observed variation in takeover premiums over time. Results support our hypotheses that some industry and economic factors can increase the growth prospects in an industry, which boosts expected synergies and/or demand for the target firm, and therefore increases the merger premiums. Merger premiums are higher when the target's corresponding industry experiences higher growth, has more research and development (a proxy for expected growth), and has less dispersion in performance among firms within the industry. Merger premiums are also positively related to capital liquidity, which can enhance economic growth and competition for target firms, and positively related to volatility in economic growth, which affect merger waves and the demand for target firms over time. 相似文献
6.
We find that the announcement of a merger withdrawal elicits negative industry effects on average, which reflect a partial reversal of the favorable industry effects that had previously occurred at the time of the merger proposal. The mean reversal is about 35% of the original favorable industry effect at the time of the merger announcement. This result for the mean effect is opposite of that found by Akhigbe et al. (2000). When we break our sample into sub-periods, we find that industry effects are substantially weaker in a more recent sub-period beyond the sample period used by Akhigbe et al. (2000). We also find that the industry effects are more negative when the share price response of the target at the time of the announced withdrawal is weaker. Whether the negative impact on the target is attributed to either a reduced likelihood of takeover or weaker industry prospects, it carries over to industry rivals. 相似文献
7.
This study focuses on the economic exchange rate exposure of 168 U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) with foreign operations primarily in Europe. The sampling plan and other refinements may improve the estimation of exposure and detection of relevant determinants. Operating characteristics that represent economic exposure are evaluated for their ability, to explain cross-sectional differences in exposure. More specifically, the degree of imbalance, which is a proxy for matching cash inflows and outflows, and proportion of export sales are able to explain differential exposure. Furthermore, shifts in the degree of imbalance and proportion of export sales are found to significantly explain shifts in exposure. 相似文献
8.
The financial press suggests that information is commonly leaked prior to analyst recommendations. We examine the impact that three regulatory actions (Regulation Fair Disclosure, Global Analysts Research Settlement, and the legal case against Galleon Group) have on information leakage prior to analyst recommendations. We find that all three regulatory actions have significantly reduced the leakage of information prior to analyst recommendations, even after controlling for several characteristics that explain the variation in information leakage. Our results are robust when applying an alternative method of measuring information leakage, and when forming various samples of analyst recommendations based on different criteria. 相似文献
9.
It is well documented that financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about that firm. Our goal is to determine whether financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about large stakeholders who have a substantial investment in those firms. In particular, we focus on financing decisions by firms after they had been partially acquired to determine whether these decisions signaled information that affected the values of their corresponding partial acquirers. We find that some financing policies by partially acquired firms may not only signal valuable information about themselves, but may also signal valuable information about their corresponding partial acquirers. We also find that the magnitude of the signal for the partially acquired firm that enacts a financing policy is dependent on the degree of monitoring imposed by the respective partial acquirer. JEL classification: G14, G34 相似文献
10.
Several studies find that bond rating downgrades cause negative valuation effects. Other studies find that signals conveyed by earnings releases, earnings forecasts, bankruptcies, and stock offerings of individual firms can be transmitted to their corresponding industries. By combining the two sets of studies, we hypothesize that bond rating changes may contain relevant information not only about the firm, but also about the corresponding industry. We find significantly negative valuation effects for rating downgrades, which are transmitted throughout the industry. Furthermore, we find that intra-industry effects depend on particular characteristics of the bond downgrade, the downgraded firm, and industry rivals. Specifically, the negative intra-industry effects are more pronounced when (1) the downgraded firm experiences a more severe share price response to the bond rating downgrade, (2) the downgraded firm is dominant in the industry, (3) the downgraded firm is more closely related to its rivals in the industry, and (4) the downgrade is due to a deterioration in the firm's financial prospects. 相似文献