Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.     

The economics of nonprofit organisations' governance

We determine theoretically when we can expect agency problems amenable to shirking agents to arise in nonprofit organisations and derive the conditions for governance measures to remedy these. Agents' private benefits of shirking need to be considered combined with the effect of their efforts on the probabilities of being successful in fundraising and production. If this effect is large, agency problems can more easily be avoided. Sufficient conditions for governance measures to reduce agency problems are derived. The empirical literature fits a number of the results derived and shows important gaps, especially w.r.t. the role of success probabilities.     

The value relevance of comprehensive income under alternative presentation formats permitted by ASU 2011-05

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Under Accounting Standards Update 2011-05, firms can present comprehensive income (CI), defined as the sum of net income (NI) and other comprehensive...     

Doorsteps Toward Political and Economic Openness: Testing the North-Wallis-Weingast Transition Framework

In this paper, we test the theoretical framework developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), who posit that limited-access societies need to meet three doorstep conditions before they can transit into open-access societies: (1) establishment of rule of law among elites, (2) adoption of perpetually existing organizations, and (3) political control of the military. We identify indicators reflecting these doorsteps and econometrically test their relationships with specific political and economic variables. We broadly confirm the logic behind the doorsteps as necessary conditions in the transition to open-access societies. The doorsteps influence economic and political processes, as well as each other, with varying intensities.     

Inequality‐averse well‐being measurement

We construct individual well‐being measures that respect individual preferences and depend on the bundles of goods consumed by the individual. Building on previous work in which general families of well‐being measures are identified, we introduce basic transfer principles that apply either to bundles or directly to indifference sets, and we characterize specific well‐being measures that involve either the ray utility or the money‐metric utility.     

Central Bank Actions and Words: The Intraday Effects of FOMC Policy Communications on Individual Equity Volatility and Returns

We compare intraday impacts of the release of Federal Reserve decision announcements and of Federal Open Market Committee minutes between 2004 and 2015 on 1,997 equity return and volatility series. We find that returns are unresponsive to either news release, but conditional volatility increases for both, manifesting immediately after each information release, and persisting for 30 minutes post‐announcement. These effects are larger for decisions than for minutes. On stratifying firms by trading intensity, we find most “high trading intensity” firms respond to these announcements, while “low trading intensity” firms are less affected. Our results show that traders respond, albeit differently, to both sets of information releases.     

The perverse effect of environmental regulation on emissions: The role of product-mix changes

We study the effect of environmental regulation (taxation) on emissions when the only available abatement method consists of product-mix changes. Firms choose to produce one or both varieties of a product—a pollution-intensive (dirty) and a non-pollution-intensive (green)—and compete in a differentiated Cournot duopoly. We characterize the equilibrium market structure as a function of the tax rate and show that increases in the tax can promote product-mix changes that lead to a jump in emissions for some tax range, an effect we call the perverse effect of taxation. Our work emphasizes the key role horizontal product differentiation in this process and shows that the perverse effect does not require the presence of vertical product differentiation. Further, the perverse effect of taxation is especially strong in the presence of incomplete regulation, that is, when only one of the markets is subject to taxation.