Handelsrestriktionen gegen Russland belasten sektoral und regional unterschiedlich stark

Wirtschaftsdienst - Die militärische Eskalation in der Ukraine sowie die aufgrund der Sanktionen einsetzenden Bremseffekte für die Kapital- und Handelsströme werden die deutsche...     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Offshoring and skill overlap: An empirical investigation

Conventional international trade theory predicts that bilateral offshoring flows will be highest when two countries have very different relative factor endowments. In contrast, the new trade theory contends that offshoring is more likely to exist when countries’ relative factor endowments are similar. This paper empirically tests the relationship between offshoring and relative factor endowments, measured by the skill overlap index between two countries and finds evidence that there is an inverted U‐shape relationship. Our empirical results predict that the rise in educational attainment in China will motivate U.S. multinationals to send their tasks to China in the short run; over the long run, however, U.S. multinationals will have fewer incentives to send their tasks to China. This finding sheds new light on the current trade tensions between the United States and China and has implications for trade policy.     

When and Why Do Takeovers Lead to Fraud?

This paper develops a model explaining how acquisitions of controlling block ownership can facilitate post‐takeover fraud by new managers when investor protection is poor. Based on disclosures of embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty in Korean firms, we find that the probability of explicit looting in takeover targets is 13%, almost five times as large as a matched sample of non‐targets. Post‐takeover frauds are primarily driven by transfers of minority blocks, while the corresponding probability in majority acquisitions is statistically indistinguishable from the non‐targets. These findings may explain why minority acquisitions of controlling blocks are popular under poor investor protection.     

Content analysis of fake consumer reviews by survey-based text categorization

As the influence of online consumer reviews grows, deceptive reviews are a worsening problem, betraying consumers' trust in reviews by pretending to be authentic and informative. This research identifies factors that can separate deceptive reviews from genuine ones. First, we create a novel means of detection by contrasting authentic versus fake word patterns specific to a given domain (e.g., hotel services). We use a survey on a crowdsourcing platform to obtain both genuine and deceptive reviews of hotels. We learned the word patterns from each category to discriminate genuine reviews from fake ones for positively and negatively evaluated reviews, respectively. We show that our All Terms procedure outperforms current benchmark methods in computational linguistics and marketing. Our extended analysis reveals the factors that determine fake reviews (e.g., a lack of details, present- and future-time orientation, and emotional exaggeration) and the factors influencing people's willingness to write fake reviews (including social media trust, product quality consciousness, deal proneness, hedonic and utilitarian consumption, prosocial behavior, and individualism). We also use our procedure to analyze more than 250,000 real-world hotel reviews to detect fake reviews and identify the hotel and review characteristics influencing review fakery in the industry (e.g., star rating, franchise hotel, hotel size, room price, review timing, and review rating).     

The Effect of Litigation Risk Increase on Big N Auditor Exits and Audit Quality in the Korean Savings Banking Industry

This study investigates whether an increase in litigation risk results in Big N auditors leaving the industry and examines the impact of this increase on audit quality. Using a sample of Korean savings banks from 2009 to 2015, the study finds that the proportion of Big N auditors sharply decreases after a savings bank crisis, suggesting that Big N auditors are likely to reject riskier clients, while audit quality is unchanged. The results provide new evidence that an increase in litigation risk does not necessarily increase audit quality. The findings have academic and practical implications, as they suggest that policies for improving audit quality should consider auditors’ strategies in response to litigation risk.     

Hyperbolic normal stochastic volatility model

For option pricing models and heavy-tailed distributions, this study proposes a continuous-time stochastic volatility model based on an arithmetic Brownian motion: a one-parameter extension of the normal stochastic alpha-beta-rho (SABR) model. Using two generalized Bougerol's identities in the literature, the study shows that our model has a closed-form Monte Carlo simulation scheme and that the transition probability for one special case follows Johnson's distribution—a popular heavy-tailed distribution originally proposed without stochastic process. It is argued that the distribution serves as an analytically superior alternative to the normal SABR model because the two distributions are empirically similar.