COMMODITY CONTENT IN A GENERAL INPUT–OUTPUT MODEL: A COMMENT

This paper critically analyses the approach to the determination of values, or commodity contents, developed by Fujimoto and Opocher in 2009. Even setting aside various problematic definitional issues, the broader implications of the approach for classical theory are unclear. First, the value‐theoretic definitions of skill differentials and bads capture at best necessary conditions and it is unlikely that such definitions can be provided by focusing only on the technological data of the economy. Second, the approach has various interesting implications concerning the relation between productiveness and exploitation that directly contradict some of the authors' claims.     

IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest

The underwriter of an IPO has two sources of compensation for its services on behalf of the issuer. One is through a commission (spread), the other is by buying issued shares for itself (or its affiliates) and reselling them in the post-issue market. Profits from the former decrease along with the magnitude of underpricing while profits from the latter increase with it. Faced with these countervailing interests, the present paper analyzes how the underwriter decides upon the pricing and allocation of IPOs.      

Optimal Mortgage Refinancing with Regime Switches

A model of rational mortgage refinancing is developed where the drift and volatility of interest rate process switch between two regimes. Because of the possibility of a regime shift, the optimal refinancing policy is characterized by the different threshold of interest differential for each regime. Numerical simulation demonstrates that the optimal refinancing threshold in each regime can be smaller or larger than the threshold under single-regime models. Finally, we evaluate the predictions of the model, based on the estimated parameters for a two-regime model to capture the evolution of the mortgage rates in the US. Our model can produce both late and early refinancing, which is consistent with the observed refinancing behavior. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.     

Correction to: Accounting Frauds and Main-Bank Monitoring in Japanese Corporations

Journal of Business Ethics -     

Parent country nationals or local nationals for executive positions in foreign affiliates: An empirical study of Japanese affiliates in Korea

This study examines how the host country experience of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) affects their staffing policies for executive manager positions at foreign affiliates. Hypotheses on executive staffing policies for foreign affiliates are tested using survey data collected from 103 Japanese affiliates in Korea. Findings show that the level of global integration and the degree of centralization of decision-making positively affect an assignment of parent country nationals as executive managers of foreign affiliates. We further find that foreign affiliates’ experience in a host country moderates the effects of both global integration and centralization on staffing decisions for the affiliates.

Wealth,Exploitation and Labor Discipline in the Contemporary Capitalist Economy

This paper synthesizes in a Leontief economic model the arguments of exploitation and unequal distribution of wealth put forward by Roemer (1982, 1986) and of the power relationship between employers and employees with regard to the performance of labor presented by Bowles and Gintis (1988, 1990). The author introduces the level of the agent’s labor-discipline as measured by the ratio of labor effort per unit of labor time to the real wage rate. The connection bet ween this kind of power index and both exploitation status and wealth distribution is then examined. The result obtained is that, under some reasonable assumptions, the exploitation status and the level of labor-discipline accurately reflect the unequal distribution of wealth.     

Creation of jobs and firm-sponsored training in a matching model of unemployment

We offer a search and matching model with firms that create job vacancies and are willing to sponsor general skills training. The spillover of skilled labor between firms has the dual effect of increasing job vacancies and enhancing firms’ incentives for free riding. The former effect is combined with a reduction in search costs to cause a positive feedback between the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies, suggesting that firms encourage each other. On the other hand, with the latter effect, search costs are reduced, inducing firms to take a free ride on each other’s investments, thereby decreasing the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies. A reduction in search costs can lead to different results depending on which of the two mechanisms is actualized. Additionally, our analysis allows for “labor poachers,” or firms absorbing skilled labor in the market, to consider direct competition between training firms and poaching firms.      

The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results

We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003.     

Relationship between Managerial Compensation and Business Performance in Japan: New Evidence Using Micro Data*

This paper examines the relationship between the level of managerial compensation and the quality of corporate governance in Japan in the period following the bubble burst of 1991–1995. There are three main findings. First, Japanese firms with weaker governance have greater agency problems in that managerial opportunism extracts higher compensation and the firm performs relatively worse. Second, these agency problems were more severe during the recessionary period of 1994–1995. Finally, governance structures in industries with higher managerial compensation are relatively weaker than in other industries.