Costly Buyer Search in a Differentiated Products Model: An Experimental Study

This study examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre‐ and postsearch), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to intuition, the presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. Data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition, and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted.     

Medication,equipment, and supply costs for common interventions providing extended post-surgical analgesia following total knee arthroplasty in US hospitals

Aims: To estimate the cost to hospitals of materials (i.e. medications, equipment, and supplies) required to administer common interventions for post-surgical analgesia after total knee arthroplasty (TKA), including single-injection peripheral nerve block (sPNB), continuous peripheral nerve block (cPNB), periarticular infiltration of multi-drug cocktails, continuous epidural analgesia, intravenous patient-controlled analgesia (IV PCA), and local infiltration of bupivacaine liposome injectable suspension (BLIS).

Materials and methods: This analysis was conducted using a mixed methods approach combining published literature, publicly available data sources, and administrative data, to first identify the materials required to administer these interventions, and then estimate the cost to the hospital of those materials. Medication costs were estimated primarily using the Wholesale Acquisition Costs (WAC), the cost of reusable equipment was obtained from published sources, and costs for disposable supplies were obtained from the US Government Services Administration (GSA) database. Where uncertainty existed about the technique used when administering these interventions, costs were calculated for multiple scenarios reflecting different assumptions.

Results: The total cost of materials (i.e. medications, equipment, and supplies) required to provide post-surgical analgesia was $41.88 for sPNB with bupivacaine; $756.57 for cFNB with ropivacaine; $16.38 for periarticular infiltration with bupivacaine, morphine, methylprednisolone, and cefuroxime; $453.84 for continuous epidural analgesia with fentanyl and ropivacaine; $178.94 for IV PCA with morphine; and $319.00 for BLIS.

Limitations: This analysis did not consider the cost of healthcare providers required to administer these interventions. In addition, this analysis focused on the cost of materials and, therefore, did not consider aspects of relative efficacy or safety, or how the choice of intervention for post-surgical analgesia might impact outcomes such as length of stay, re-admissions, discharge status, adverse events, or total hospitalization costs.

Conclusions: This study provided an estimate of the costs to hospitals for materials required to administer commonly used interventions for post-surgical analgesia after TKA.     

Ethnic fragmentation,public good provision and inequality in India, 1988–2012

We study how ethnic fragmentation in Indian districts influences the distribution of consumption, both overall and between social groups. In the absence of systematic evidence on inequality between social groups (horizontal inequality) during the sample period, we construct estimates of horizontal and overall inequality, and find that horizontal inequality is a small proportion of overall inequality, as well as that both overall and horizontal inequality have increased over time. Our empirical results indicate that more fragmented districts have higher inequality, but the relationship between fragmentation and horizontal inequality is weak. Additionally, we show that fragmentation increases inequality by lowering public good provision.     

The resource dynamics of early internationalising Indian IT firms

Building on the resource-based view of the firm, this study explores how firms entering into early internationalisation combine different resources to discover the international market opportunities. Based on an in-depth analysis of case studies of five knowledge-intensive firms from India, this study suggests that the differences in the extent of resources available and their combinations influence the early stage of the internationalisation process and pace of learning in the foreign markets. This study contributes to the existing research on international entrepreneurship by explaining how new international ventures overcome the challenges of internationalisation by wisely utilising a broad set of available and potential resources during their early internationalisation efforts and gradually shift the focus on the internalisation of resources. Moreover, this study suggests that the effects of the combination of resources vary across different ventures. A strong combination can increase internationalisation and minimise the risks of failure in new international ventures.     

Within-syndicate conflicts,loan covenants,and syndicate formation

We study how conflicts within a lending syndicate affect loan contract and syndicate formation. We argue that loan provisions serve an important dual function: In addition to moderating borrower–lender conflicts, they reduce within-syndicate conflicts. We show that greater potential for within-syndicate conflicts is associated with more and stricter covenants. Loans are less restrictive when the interests of participants and the lead arrangers are better aligned, for example, when participant–banks have stronger relationships with the lead arranger or hold borrower's equity (indirectly). Overall, our results show that covenant choice, syndicate formation, and lead arranger's loan allocation all play an important role in reducing within-syndicate conflicts.     

Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox

This study considers a model of road congestion with average cost pricing. Subjects must choose between two routes—Road and Metro. The travel cost on the road is increasing in the number of commuters who choose this route, while the travel cost on the metro is decreasing in the number of its users. We examine how changes to the road capacity, the number of commuters, and the metro pricing scheme influence the commuters’ route-choice behavior. According to the Downs-Thomson paradox, improved road capacity increases travel times along both routes because it attracts more users to the road and away from the metro, thereby worsening both services. A change in route design generates two Nash equilibria; and the resulting coordination problem is amplified even further when the number of commuters is large. We find that, similar to other binary choice experiments with congestion effects, aggregate traffic flows are close to the equilibrium levels, but systematic individual differences persist over time.     

Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis

We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a price-setting duopoly with capacity constraints. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our timing game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. Experimental data show that price leadership by the large firm is frequent, but simultaneous moves are also often observed. Profit outcomes in the previous period affect the subjects’ decisions to announce or wait in a way that hampers convergence to the equilibrium. Furthermore, while both small and large firms display a strong tendency to wait to announce their price when firm size asymmetry is low, they often set prices early when size asymmetry is high. Prices are higher when price setting is sequential rather than simultaneous and when firm size asymmetry is high. Hence, price leadership by either type of firm has an anti-competitive effect that is more pronounced when the size difference between firms is large.     

Allocation of decision rights and the investment strategy of mutual funds

The literature suggests that while decentralized decision making can allow for greater specialization in an organization, it heightens the cost of coordinating decisions. The mutual fund industry—in particular, sole- and team-managed balanced funds—provides an ideal setting to test the specialization versus coordination trade-off, as information on decision structures and fund actions is easily obtained. We show that sole-managed balanced funds, with centralized decision rights, exhibit significant market timing that requires reallocation across asset classes. However, consistent with coordination difficulties between managers specializing in particular asset classes, no market timing is evident in team-managed balanced funds. Team-managed funds exhibit greater returns from specialization, in the form of better security selection performance than sole-managed funds. These results hold cross-sectionally and for funds that switch management structures. The overall returns across different management structures are similar, indicating a market equilibrium. Investor flows reward market-timing performance for sole- but not team-managed funds.     

Disappearing and Reappearing Dividends in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Indian Companies

This article examines the empirical determinants of dividend payout policy for 947 sample firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in India from 1995 to 2013. The author identifies three distinct trends in the propensity to pay dividends between 1995 and 2013. The regression analysis suggests that most of the decline is due to the dividend payout policies of smaller, less profitable, younger firms and firms with comparatively more investment opportunities, high financial leverage, high business risk, and high dividend distribution tax. The author finds significant positive impact of catering incentives on the propensity to pay dividends, thus supporting catering theory of dividends.