A Continuous-Time Optimal Insurance Design with Costly Monitoring

We provide a theoretical and numerical framework to study optimal insurance design under asymmetric information. We consider a continuous-time model where neither the efforts nor the outcome of an insured firm are observable to an insurer. The insured may then cause two interconnected information problems: moral hazard and fraudulent claims. We show that, when costly monitoring is available, an optimal insurance contract distinguishes the one problem from the other. Furthermore, if the insured’s downward-risk aversion is weak and if the participation constraint is not too tight, then a higher level of the monitoring technology can mitigate both problems.     

Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market

In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.     

Does agricultural trade liberalization increase risks of supply-side uncertainty?: Effects of productivity shocks and export restrictions on welfare and food supply in Japan

Agriculture is the focus of much contention in free trade negotiations. The Japanese government is against liberalizing the rice trade on the grounds that it would threaten “national food security” in the events of such shocks as crop failure and embargoes. Trade liberalization is expected to make the Japanese economy more dependent upon food imports and, thus, more susceptible to these risks. Using a computable general equilibrium model with a Monte Carlo simulation, we quantify the welfare impacts of productivity shocks and export quotas by major rice exporters to Japan and found little evidence of Japan suffering from such shocks.     

A COMPLETE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE INVERTED S‐SHAPED LABOR SUPPLY CURVE

Empirical evidence suggests that labor supply curves are downward sloping at low wage levels, i.e. ‘forward‐falling labor supply’. In contrast, the supply curve is only downward sloping at high wage levels in the canonical labor supply model, i.e. ‘backward‐bending’. This paper derives a labor supply curve with both forward‐falling and backward‐bending segments, or an ‘inverted S‐shape’ by incorporating two elements into a standard utility function: a subsistence level of consumption and a decreasing elasticity of substitution. It is also shown that the subsistence level of consumption plays a key role in determining the shape of the labor supply curve.     

Estimating switching costs after introducing Fixed-Mobile Convergence in Japan

In this study, based on a conjoint-type survey analysis, the switching cost of several Japanese telecom services are empirically examined simultaneously, contingent on each carrier’s bundling strategies. The results suggest the following conclusions. The hierarchy of switching costs is mobile phone service, fixed phone service, ISP (Internet Service Provider), and broadband access service, in descending order. Even if the government prohibits the formerly state-owned monopoly NTT from forming alliances with other carriers, the legacy NTT group would still command more than half of the market share under FMC if each carrier adopts a pure bundling strategy. If mixed bundling emerges as the primary strategy in the FMC market, the resulting type of competition from the introduction of FMC does not stimulate competitive pricing.     

Firms' open innovation policies,laboratories' external collaborations,and laboratories' R&D performance

The value of the open innovation approach is now widely recognized, and the practice has been extensively researched, but still very little is known about the relative impact of firm‐level and laboratory‐level open innovation policies and practices on R&D performance. This study attempts to measure that impact by analyzing a sample of 203 laboratories of Japanese firms located in Japan. It examines simultaneously the effects of firm‐level open innovation policy and laboratory‐level external collaborations on laboratory R&D performance. The study aims to go beyond a general understanding of the importance of open innovation; it shows how an open innovation policy can have a positive and significant effect on collaborations between a laboratory and local universities or business organizations. The results also show how an open innovation policy can contribute to the laboratory's R&D performance by facilitating external collaborations by the laboratories. It demonstrates how these factors affect R&D performance in different ways, depending on the type of R&D tasks. Our findings suggest several theoretical and practical implications in the field of R&D management.     

Two Types of Disagreement in Group Discussions of Japanese Undergraduates

In this study we investigated the nature of disagreement, which is a necessary component of a good discussion. We obtained 27 group discussion scenes by Japanese undergraduates that were evaluated by two ways: impression rating and ranking. As a result of factor analysis for the impression rating data, five factors were extracted: activeness, multidirection and unification of discussion, relationships of participants, development and sophistication of discussion, and sincerity of the participants, and each factor scores of each scene was simultaneously calculated. Each scene’s rank score was also calculated by relative comparisons. A significant positive correlation was found between the mean factor and the rank scores except for Factor 3 (relationships of participants). To consider the reason for the difference relating to Factor 3’s score, we scrutinized the discussion process of four scenes of the different patterns of the factor and rank scores. From the analysis of conversations, we suggested that this difference reflected ways of disagreement. By introducing a probative discourse tags for discussion (pDTD), we reasoned that the frequency of disagreement made Factor 3’s score negative and the absence of the second part of adjacency pairs made the rank score worse. The explicit speech and actions of blame such as emotional and aggressive expression, and neglect of treatment for the minor opinion made also the discussion unfair, but we think that these behaviors might erupt from the ground made by the accumulated implicit behaviors such as the absence of the second part. We finally concluded that the criticism type of disagreement increased the rank scores, and its censure type produced lower results, and the proper ways of disagreement in group discussions were discussed.     

Micro-foundation for a constant elasticity of substitution production function through mechanization

We consider an increase in the range of capital use as a form of mechanization. A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function is dynamically derived from Leontief production functions through the endogenous complementary relationship between capital accumulation and mechanization. This implies that a CES production function can be resolved into technological change that does not involve changes in total factor productivity. Furthermore, using the normalizing procedure of the CES production function developed by de La Grandville [de La Grandville, O., 1989. In quest of the Slutsky diamond. American Economic Review 79, 468–481], we investigate how mechanization is related to the elasticity of substitution in our endogenous growth model.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.