Mortality salience – shedding light on the dark experience

ABSTRACT

Mortality salience, a key term in Terror Management Theory, refers to self-awareness of one’s vulnerability and ultimate mortality. This exploratory study, based on psychology and tourism literature, clarifies the degree to which a visit to a heritage site of death and atrocities evokes mortality salience as well as the relationship between mortality salience and various dimensions of the visit experience. The findings indicate that not only was mortality salience evoked during the visit, it is also an important component in understanding the motivation to visit dark sites, the emotional experience of the visit, and the impact of the visit on visitors. We therefore propose that the conceptualization and management of a death-centered heritage site can be enriched by the integration of sense of mortality salience. Additionally, the high Cronbach’s alpha suggests that the study can provide an initial basis for a scale to quantitatively measure Mortality Salience.     

静脉曲张是高科技？外行也能做得很出色

世界上有很多人有过不错的创意，但是他们当中的大部分人缺少自信、专业知识和经验。宰吾（Zeev）相信，有好的想法以后，可以自学所需要的知识，积累所需要的经验，以实践自己的想法     

Financial distress and the business cycle

In this paper we argue that firms' financial distress shouldplay a greater role in the macroeconomic analysis of the businesscycle. We provide a non-technical account of a general equilibriummodel that exhibits financially-driven equilibrium cycles. Weshow that the empirical evidence is widely supportive of thekey hypothesis and implications of our approach. We use themodel in order to evaluate the effects of several policy measures.It turns out that deepening the market for second-hand capitalgoods, subsidizing the interest payments of companies whichstart up when financial conditions are tight, and bailing outsome companies in default can indeed 'stabilize' the economy.By way of generalization, we may say that the policy reactionto a financially driven bust should be accommodating.     

Disclosure, leaks, and slips: Issues and strategies for prohibiting employee communication

Both popular and social science literature are replete with recommendations for enhancing communication effectiveness, typically defined as improving the clarity and impact of the spoken and written word. However, managing internal organizational processes and external market competitiveness often requires a different communication strategy, specifically silence and non-disclosure, while adhering to statutory regulations. This article summarizes the rationale for communication prohibitions, highlights counter forces mitigating their intended effects, and offers recommendations for successful implementation. The three major counter forces are: employee motivation and perception, changing socio-cultural norms, and organizational structures reflecting virtual teams and project teams. The eight recommendations for combating these forces are subsumed under one of two categories: creating an organizational culture supporting prohibitions, and executing the prohibitions with a minimum of employee resistance. In summary, employees charged with maintaining secrecy and adhering to non-disclosure prohibitions must view those restrictions as reasonable, warranted, equitable, and legal.     

Priority Network Access Pricing for Electric Power

We propose a priority-pricing scheme for zonal access to the electric power grid that is uniform across all buses in a zone. The independent system operator (ISO) charges bulk power traders a per unit ex ante transmission access fee. The zonal access fee serves as an access insurance premium that entitles a bulk power trader to either physical injection of one unit of energy or a compensation payment. The access fee per MWh depends on the injection zone and a self-selected strike price that serves as an insurance deductible that determines the scheduling priority of the insured transaction and the compensation level in case of curtailment. Inter-zonal transactions are charged (or credited) with an additional ex post congestion fee equal to the differences in zonal spot prices. The compensation for curtailed transactions equals the difference between the realized zonal spot price and the selected strike price (deductible level). The ISO manages congestion so as to minimize net compensation payments and thus, curtailment probabilities increase with strike price and for any particular strike price may vary from bus to bus. We calculate the rational expectations equilibrium for three-, four- and six-node systems and demonstrate that the efficiency losses of the proposed second best scheme relative to the efficient dispatch solutions are modest.     

Two-settlement Systems for Electricity Markets under Network Uncertainty and Market Power

We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system operator. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which we model as a random capacity derating of an important transmission line. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion (derating), forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets (as shown in Allaz and Vila 1993) may be nullified to a great extent. There is a spot transmission charge reflecting transportation costs from location of generation to a designated hub whose price is the underlying for the forward contract. This alleviates some of the incentive problems associated with the forward market in which spot-market trading is residual. We find that the reduction in forward trading is due to the segregation of the markets in the constrained state, and the absence of natural incentives for generators to commit to more aggressive behavior in the spot market (the strategic substitutes effect). In our analysis, we find that the standard assumption of no-arbitrage across forward and spot markets leads to very little contract coverage, even for the case with no congestion. We present an alternative view of the market where limited intertemporal arbitrage enables temporal price discrimination by competing duopolists. In this framework, we assume that all of the demand shows up in the forward market (or that the market is cleared against an accurate forecast of the demand), and the forward price is determined using a market clearing condition.