Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices

Governments intervene in firms' lives in a variety of ways. To enhance the efficiency of government intervention, many researchers and policy makers call for governments to make use of information contained in stock market prices. However, price informativeness is endogenous to government policy. We analyze government policy in light of this endogeneity. In some cases, it is optimal for a government to commit to limit its reliance on market prices to avoid harming the aggregation of information into market prices. For similar reasons, it is optimal for a government to limit transparency in some dimensions.     

Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage‐Backed Securities

Initial yields on both AAA‐rated and non‐AAA rated mortgage‐backed security (MBS) tranches sold by large issuers are higher than yields on similar tranches sold by small issuers during the market boom years of 2004 to 2006. Moreover, the prices of MBS sold by large issuers drop more than those sold by small issuers, and the differences are concentrated among tranches issued during 2004 to 2006. These results suggest that investors price the risk that large issuers received more inflated ratings than small issuers, especially during boom periods.     

Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment

This paper examines infrastructure investment incentives under a system of 'regulation by negotiation'. We demonstrate that an appropriately specified access pricing rule can induce private firms to choose to invest at a socially optimal time. The optimal regulatory regime allocates investment costs to the access provider and seeker based on their relative use-values of the facility. It is superior to an unregulated environment because it commits firms ex ante to an access charge that allows for sunk cost recovery. In addition, we show that when the time that access is sought is flexible both replacement- and historical-cost asset valuation methodologies can lead to optimal investment incentives. However, when seeker timing is restricted, historical cost can give rise to distorted incentives.     

The Role of Financial Incentives in Balanced Scorecard‐Based Performance Evaluations: Correcting Mood Congruency Biases

Moods are low‐intensity affective states that individuals bring to a decision, and may be especially important when the balanced scorecard (BSC) is used for performance evaluation purposes. We propose that financial incentives can motivate decision‐makers to correct mood congruency biases, in which judgments and decisions are consistent with moods. In experiment 1, participants rated the performance of one division manager based on two accounting measures and another manager based on a 16‐measure BSC; there were mood congruency biases at both levels of information load. Financial incentives to make benchmark‐consistent judgments eliminated bias in the former condition but not in the BSC condition. In experiment 2, incentives were offered and performance evaluations were based on an eight‐measure BSC; mood congruency bias was eliminated. Results suggest that management control systems, specifically financial incentives, should be included in future affect correction research.     

The Composition of Government Spending and the Real Exchange Rate

We show that the composition of government spending influences the long-run behavior of the real exchange rate. We develop a two-sector small open-economy model in which an increase in government consumption is associated with real appreciation, while an increase in government investment may generate real depreciation. Our empirical work confirms that government consumption and government investment have differential effects on the real exchange rate and the relative price of nontradables.