Institutional ownership,cross-shareholdings and corporate cash reserves in Japan

Cross-country studies document a negative relation between corporate governance and cash holdings. In contrast, this relation is found to be positive in the United States. In this paper, we examine the case of Japanese firms. Using institutional ownership and cross-shareholdings as the main governance variables, we show that better governance is associated with higher cash balances as in the United States. The reason is that better-governed firms make better investment decisions. Their investments are not driven by excess liquidity and result in higher profitability and higher firm valuation. Overall, our findings indicate that management profligacy is a bigger concern to shareholders than management propensity to hoard cash because of risk aversion.     

Gender and Promotions: Evidence from Academic Economists in France*

The promotion system for French academic economists provides an interesting environment to examine the promotion gap between men and women. Promotions occur through national competitions for which we have information both on candidates and on those eligible to be candidates. Thus, we can examine the two stages of the process: application and success. Women are less likely to seek promotion, and this accounts for up to 76 percent of the promotion gap. Being a woman also reduces the probability of promotion conditional on applying, although the gender difference is not statistically significant. Our results highlight the importance of the decision to apply.     

Analyzing credit risk transmission to the nonfinancial sector in Europe: A network approach

We use a factor model and elastic net shrinkage to model a high-dimensional network of European credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Our empirical approach allows us to assess the joint transmission of bank and sovereign risk to the nonfinancial corporate sector. Our findings identify a sectoral clustering in the CDS network, where financial institutions are in the center and nonfinancial entities as well as sovereigns are grouped around the financial center. The network has a geographical component reflected in different patterns of real-sector risk transmission across countries. Our framework also provides dynamic estimates of risk transmission, a useful tool for systemic risk monitoring.     

Partner‐diversity effects on alliance termination in the early stage of green alliance formation: Empirical evidence from carbon‐emission reduction projects in Latin America

Partner diversity is a key influencer in interorganizational alliances, and several empirical studies have shown that its outcomes are contingent on alliance‐specific factors. We extend this research as well as the growing literature on green alliances, in which partner diversity is uniquely high. Specifically, we examine partner‐diversity effects on alliance termination in the early stage of green alliance formation. We hypothesize that in this context, size disparity increases termination likelihood, whereas organizational variety and cultural separation have the opposite effect. To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of 366 alliance projects located in Latin America and submitted to the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism for evaluation, validation, and registration from 2004 to 2014. Our findings contribute to several research streams and provide practical guidance for successful formation of alliances focused on environmental protection.     

Asia's ‘little divergence’ in the twentieth century: evidence from PPP-based direct estimates of GDP per capita, 1913–69

This article uses expenditure-based purchasing power parities (PPPs) to estimate GDP per capita in comparable prices for 12 Asian countries for six benchmark years during the period 1913–69. The article finds that in 1913 levels of real GDP per capita in several countries were comparable to those in Japan. GDP per capita in Japan and other Asian countries diverged during and after the First World War. The article questions whether Asia's ‘little divergence’ between Japan and other Asian countries dates back to the late eighteenth century. It draws attention to the different resource endowments of Japan, China, and India compared to other Asian countries, and their implications for the development trajectories of Asian countries. The article demonstrates that using historical PPP estimates yields estimates of GDP per capita that diverge from those based on retropolations of the single 1990 PPP-converted benchmark year. It concludes that historical estimates of PPPs are needed to confirm analyses of comparative economic performance based on available GDP per capita data.     

A critical overview of privacy-preserving approaches for collaborative forecasting

Cooperation between different data owners may lead to an improvement in forecast quality—for instance, by benefiting from spatiotemporal dependencies in geographically distributed time series. Due to business competitive factors and personal data protection concerns, however, said data owners might be unwilling to share their data. Interest in collaborative privacy-preserving forecasting is thus increasing. This paper analyzes the state-of-the-art and unveils several shortcomings of existing methods in guaranteeing data privacy when employing vector autoregressive models. The methods are divided into three groups: data transformation, secure multi-party computations, and decomposition methods. The analysis shows that state-of-the-art techniques have limitations in preserving data privacy, such as (i) the necessary trade-off between privacy and forecasting accuracy, empirically evaluated through simulations and real-world experiments based on solar data; and (ii) iterative model fitting processes, which reveal data after a number of iterations.     

Ethnic divisions and the effect of appropriative competition intensity on economic performance

This paper features a growth model with an appropriative contest and a common-pool investment game between politically organised rival ethnic factions. I determine how the long-run equilibrium coalition shapes incentives to invest, show the existence of a unique steady state, and investigate how the ease to capture rents affects economic performance. The use of numerical simulations concerning a global sample of countries demonstrates that contest intensity can sometimes be beneficial, despite wasteful grabbing behaviours, due to a mechanism related to the concentration of power. When rents become easier to capture, dominant groups have an incentive to expand their influence further. This adjustment can be beneficial as these groups contribute most to capital accumulation.