Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly: A correction

This paper shows that there is no interior solution in Mai–Hwang's 1992 oligopolistic location model with free entry when the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. The comparative static results of the impact of a demand change on the location decision only apply to the case where the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. It re-examines the impact of a demand change on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and corrects the propositions derived by [C.C. Mai, H. Hwang, Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly, Journal of Urban Economics 33 (1992) 252–271. Reprinted in: M.L. Greenhut, G. Norman (Eds.), The Economics of Location, vol. I: Location Theory, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995].     

Optimizing the credit term decisions in supply chain finance

We study a credit term determination problem in the context of a supplier-buyer supply chain. The supplier's credit term decision is simultaneously made with its production and inventory decisions, and most importantly, it is impacted by the buyer's order quantity. We present a new game-theoretic framework to model this problem, which captures the interaction between the supplier's credit term decision and the buyer's order decision in a multi-period setting. An exact method based on nonlinear programming is implemented to obtain the optimal solutions. We apply our methodologies on a real world case. The computational results show that our approach significantly outperforms the heuristics with fixed credit terms, and either a short or a long credit term can be sub-optimal for the supplier in profitability. Our work offers the first data-driven model and solution approach that assists purchasing and supply managers to make optimal dynamic credit term decision in conjunction with production, ordering and inventory decisions in a game-theoretic setting.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

市场经济下的政府行为困境:新制度经济学视角

在我国,政府调节行为的合理性与有效性对社会经济的发展有着重要的意义。因此,本文运用新制度经济学的基本原理,结合三个典型的案例,探讨我国政府在社会经济管理过程中所面临的困境,并根据其矛盾所在提出相应的措施,包括增加横向约束机制、强化三道内外监管防线、建立灵活的职能转换机制等,以提高政府"治国而平天下"的能力。     

美国会计准则超载问题:思考与启示

随着社会经济的发展,美国会计准则出现了"会计准则超载"问题.会计准则超载问题的产生是由一系列影响因素所造成的,而我国在进行会计准则的修订及完善时也可从中获得一些启示.     

当前中国农民合作社开展信用合作的典型模式、问题与建议

农民合作社开展信用合作是我国新型农村合作金融发展研究的重点。本文结合调研情况，对以赊销为特征的商业信用合作、以资金互助或担保互助为核心的货币信用合作、依托产业链或银政资金的混合式信用合作三种不同模式进行梳理分析，并从政策制度、现实操作、潜在风险点三个层面指出了当前中国农民合作社开展信用合作的主要问题。推动农民合作社信用合作持续健康发展，必须坚持服务“三农”的政策导向、强化对信用合作不同发展模式的分类指导、妥善处理风险防控和内在活力的关系、进一步规范信用合作管理、切实防控信用合作风险、充分发挥信用合作综合带动作用。     

What Causes Banking Crises? An Empirical Investigation for the World Economy

We add the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist model to a world model consisting of the US, the Euro-zone and the Rest of the World in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. We test the model against linear-detrended data and reestimate it by indirect inference; the resulting model passes the Wald test only on outputs in the two countries. We then extract the model’s implied residuals on unfiltered data to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. Banking shocks worsen the crisis but ‘traditional’ shocks explain the bulk of the crisis; the non-stationarity of the productivity shocks plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a ‘run’ of bad shocks; based on this sample Great Recessions occur on average once every quarter century. Financial shocks on their own, even when extreme, do not cause crises—provided the government acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as happened in this sample.     

商业银行流动性危机传染机理研究

银行危机传染往往给一个国家或地区的经济带来巨大的损失.不完全的银行间拆借市场中隐含了更大的银行危机传染的可能性;银行间的长期资产越多,银行间拆借的短期利率和银行间存款的长期利率越高,银行间拆借市场就越稳定,在遭受流动性冲击时,这一市场发生银行危机传染的可能性就越小.适量的银行存款对传染效应具有阻碍作用.为防范系统性风险,中国商业银行应逐步建立完备的银行间存款市场,减少政府干预,让市场约束力来强化商业银行的风险管理意识.