Auction theory adaptations for real life applications

We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios.1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative.2. We formulate a positive symmetric discrete distribution, which is likely to be followed by the total number of auction participants, and incorporate this into auction theory results.3. We develop extensions when the valuations of the bidders are interdependent and incorporate all the results developed into a final combined realistic setting.4. Our methods can be a practical tool for bidders and auction sellers to maximize their profits. The models developed here could be potentially useful for inventory estimation and for wholesale procurement of financial instruments and also non-financial commodities.All the propositions are new results and they refer to existing results which are stated as Lemmas.     

The initiation of audit committee interlocks and the contagion of accounting policy choices: evidence from special items

Review of Accounting Studies - We document that the initiation of audit committee interlocks is associated with contagion in reported special items. We argue that this is, in part, attributable to...     

Regulation,Minimum Wage and Informality: Introduction to Symposium

Are markets in developing and transition economies over‐regulated or under‐regulated? This is a perennial question in the development discourse, but one for which answers appear to come more from preset ideology than from context‐specific analysis and evidence. These issues become even more pressing when the debate turns to the links between regulation, deregulation and inequality. The recent experience of rising inequality in many countries has also brought to the fore predictable policy positions. A key aspect of labor regulation in developing countries, and one becoming more prominent in the era of rising inequality, is the minimum wage. The range of issues around regulation, minimum wage and informality was addressed by papers presented to a conference held in New Delhi on December 17–18, 2014. The conference was co‐sponsored by the World Bank, UK Department for International Development, Cornell University and Columbia University. The organizers of the conference were Kaushik Basu, Stefan Dercon, Ravi Kanbur and Jan Svejnar. A selection of papers from the conference which passed the usual review procedures of the Review of Development Economics, and a further selection of papers from those submitted to the journal, form this symposium.     

A Simple Two-Sector Model of Outsourcing

Outsourcing has become an increasingly contentious subject ever since N. Gregory Mankiw remarked in 2004 that outsourcing is just another way of doing international trade, and must be beneficial to the nation, including the workers. We construct a simple two-sector specific-factor model and explore the validity of Mankiw's remarks. We find his ideas are valid when the country does not produce any outsourced factor's work at home in that both the laborers and the nation benefit. But when some outsourced factor cum intermediate good is also produced at home, the nation still benefits but the workers may suffer.     

A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer. We also show that ex-post Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near Pareto optimal in the sense that all full winners? values are above all full losers? values.     

Price Limits, Information Acquisition, and Bid–ask Spreads: Theory and Evidence

A number of futures markets use price limits which, in effect, preclude trade from occurring at prices outside certain exogenous bounds. Noting that such markets are characterized by heterogeneously informed traders, whereas previous work on price limits assumes symmetrically informed traders, we examine the effects of price limits in a setting where market participants are asymmetrically informed. We find that imposing price limits generally lowers the quality of information acquired in equilibrium, but lowers bid–ask spreads as well. Thus, depending on the relative weights placed by society on liquidity versus price efficiency, there may exist a set of price limits that are most efficient in achieving a trade-off between liquidity and informational efficiency. We perform empirical tests of some implications of the model using cross-sectional data on price limits. We find that price limits are strongly negatively related to both price volatility and trading volume. Though other explanations for our empirical findings cannot be ruled out, these results are not inconsistent with the model's implication that price limits should be tighter for contracts which offer greater profit potential for informed traders.