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1.
This paper examines the implications of the ‘residence’ approach to taxing foreign source income such as employed by the United States. It is argued that, because the repatriation of earnings to the home country investor and not the earnings themselves are typically the source of tax liability, the foreign source income tax should affect foreign investment differently depending on the required transfers of funds within the firm.One implication of viewing the tax in this way is that in order to maximize after-tax profits, a firm should finance its foreign investment out of foreign earnings to the greatest extent possible. That is, a firm's required foreign return jumps at the point at which desired foreign investment just exhausts foreign earnings. This allows us to draw a distinction between ‘mature’ foreign operations, which are at any point in time financed at the margin by investing earnings (and perhaps also pay dividends to their parent firm in the home country), and ‘immature’ foreign affiliates, which rely on funding from their parents (and should not be paying dividends). It is noted that survey evidence on multinational firm behavior is consistent with this distinction. Direct investment data indicate that mature foreign operations probably account for nearly 90 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment.The discussion then turns to investment incentives. It is shown that the home country's rate of tax on foreign source income and the presence or absence of a foreign tax credit should be irrelevant to a mature foreign operations's investment and dividend decisions. This conclusion, which conflicts sharply with the conventional wisdom, follows because the home country tax acts as an unavoidable cost. New firms' investment decisions are, on the other hand, influenced by home country taxes. 相似文献
2.
Stefan Reichelstein 《Journal of Economic Theory》1984,32(2):384-390
This note reexamines the issue of attaining efficient resource allocations as noncooperative equilibria of a strategic game. Contrary to the spirit of earlier work on this subject, it is shown that there is an entire class of choice rules, aside from the Walrasian one, which are implementable in Nash equilibrium stategies. 相似文献
3.
Maureen McNichols Madhav V. Rajan Stefan Reichelstein 《Review of Accounting Studies》2014,19(4):1393-1435
We decompose the market-to-book ratio into two additive components: a conservatism correction factor and a future-to-book ratio. The conservatism correction factor exceeds the benchmark value of one whenever the accounting for past transactions has been subject to an (unconditional) conservatism bias. The observed history of a firm’s past investments allows us to calculate the magnitude of its conservatism correction factor, resulting in an average value that is about two-thirds of the overall market-to-book ratio. We demonstrate that our measure of Tobin’s q, obtained as the market-to-book ratio divided by the conservatism correction factor, has greater explanatory power in predicting future investments than the market-to-book ratio by itself. Our model analysis derives a number of structural properties of the conservatism correction factor, including its sensitivity to growth in past investments, the percentage of investments in intangibles, and the firm’s cost of capital. We provide empirical support for these hypothesized structural properties. 相似文献
4.
Summary. When consumers' willingness-to-pay increases by a uniform amount, the change in the resulting monopoly price is generally indeterminate. Our analysis identifies sufficient conditions on the underlying demand curve which predict both the sign and the magnitude of the resulting price change. 相似文献
5.
This paper studies the acquisition and subsequent utilization of production capacity in a multidivisional firm. In a setting
where an upstream division provides capacity services for itself and a downstream division, our analysis explores whether
the divisions should be structured as investment or profit centers. The choice of responsibility centers is naturally linked
to the internal pricing rules for capacity services. As a benchmark, we establish the efficiency of an arrangement in which
the upstream division is organized as an investment center, and capacity services to the downstream division are priced at
full historical cost. Such responsibility center arrangements may, however, be vulnerable to dynamic hold-up problems whenever
the divisional capacity assignments are fungible in the short-run, and therefore, it is essential to let divisional managers
negotiate over their actual capacity assignments. The dynamic hold-up problem can be alleviated with more symmetric choice
of responsibility centers. The firm can centralize ownership of capacity assets with the provision that both divisions rent
capacity on a periodic basis from a central unit. An alternative and more decentralized solution is obtained by a system of
bilateral capacity ownership in which both divisions become investment centers. 相似文献
6.
Madhav V. Rajan Stefan Reichelstein Mark T. Soliman 《Review of Accounting Studies》2007,12(2-3):323-370
Return on Investment (ROI) is widely regarded as a key measure of firm profitability. The accounting literature has long recognized that ROI will generally not reflect economic profitability, as determined by the internal rate of return (IRR) of a firm’s investment projects. In particular, it has been noted that accounting conservatism may result in an upward bias of ROI, relative to the underlying IRR. We examine both theoretically and empirically the behavior of ROI as a function of two variables: past growth in new investments and accounting conservatism. Higher growth is shown to result in lower levels of ROI provided the accounting is conservative, while the opposite is generally true for liberal accounting policies. Conversely, more conservative accounting will increase ROI provided growth in new investments has been “moderate” over the relevant horizon, while the opposite is true if new investments grew at sufficiently high rates. Taken together, we find that conservatism and growth are “substitutes” in their joint impact on ROI. 相似文献
7.
This paper examines a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a divisional manager has superior information regarding the profitability of an investment project available to his division. The manager also contributes to the periodic operating cash flows of his division through personally costly effort. We demonstrate that it is optimal for the principal to delegate the investment decision and to base the manager's compensation on the residual income performance measure. Our analysis points to a class of depreciation rules and to a particular capital charge rate which together ensure that a profitable (unprofitable) project makes a positive (negative) contribution to residual income in every period. As a consequence, the compensation parameters for each period can be chosen freely so as to address the moral hazard problems without impacting the manager's investment incentives. 相似文献
8.
Review of Accounting Studies - 相似文献
9.
Downar Benedikt Ernstberger Jürgen Reichelstein Stefan Schwenen Sebastian Zaklan Aleksandar 《Review of Accounting Studies》2021,26(3):1137-1175
Review of Accounting Studies - We examine the impact of a disclosure mandate for greenhouse gas emissions on firms’ subsequent emission levels and financial operating performance. For... 相似文献
10.
Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake “soft” investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short‐term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long‐term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long‐term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short‐term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one‐period contracts than with a long‐term contract. 相似文献