Attracting Long‐Term Shareholders

Corporate CEOs often say they don't hear enough from shareholders about strategic issues related to long‐term value creation. At the same time, they claim to hear with predictable regularity from short‐term investors about their success (or failure) in hitting consensus earnings targets. But as the authors of this article begin by noting, there is mounting evidence that companies get the shareholders they deserve—that companies that provide quarterly earnings guidance and otherwise focus investor attention on near‐term earnings targets tend to attract more transient investors. The authors go on to argue that companies with a compelling long‐term vision can expect to benefit not only from more farsighted managerial decision‐making, but also from building a base of longer‐term investors who share management's view of success, and how it can and ought to be achieved. Such a shift in strategic focus and disclosure toward longer‐run performance creates a virtuous cycle—one in which companies that gain the interest and backing of investors with longer horizons end up reinforcing management's confidence to undertake value‐adding investments in their company's future. Even if most companies can't pick their shareholders, they can develop an investor engagement strategy designed to attract long‐term investors. In this article, the chairman and president of FCLTGlobal outline the underlying strategy behind long‐term investor relations and the four key components of such an approach.     

Did Muhammad Ali foster industrialization in early nineteenth‐century Egypt?

Muhammad Ali, who ruled Egypt between 1805 and 1849, intervened in Egyptian markets in an attempt to foster industrialization, especially between 1812 and 1840. Like a modern marketing board, the state purchased agricultural commodities (cotton and wheat) at low prices and sold them on world markets at much higher prices, a policy equivalent to an export tax. Ali also replaced tax farming with his own land taxes. The revenues so derived were used in part to finance manufacturing investment and to build irrigation canals. In addition, Ali supplied flax and cotton at those cheap purchase prices to domestic textile manufacturing, thus subsidizing the industry. He also used non‐tariff barriers to exclude foreign competition from domestic markets. Were Ali's state‐led policies successful in fostering industry? The answer is no easier to extract from this phase of Egyptian history than from that of other poor countries at that time. This is because Egypt faced the same terms of trade boom typical of most poor commodity exporters, which was causing de‐industrialization everywhere else in the poor periphery. Ali picked a very difficult time to pursue his agenda, but we show that his policies were successful.     

Neo‐Fisherism and inflation control

According to conventional central banking wisdom, an inflation‐targeting central bank should increase (decrease) its nominal interest rate target when inflation is above (below) its target. According to neo‐Fisherites, conventional central bankers have the sign wrong. Essentially all mainstream macroeconomic models tell us that increases in nominal interest rates increase inflation—in the short run and in the long run. This paper reviews neo‐Fisherian theory and evidence and addresses issues relating to inflation control in low real interest rate environments.     

Firms cash management,adjustment cost and its impact on firms’ speed of adjustment: a cross country analysis

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We investigate the firms’ specific attributes that determine the difference in speed of adjustment (SOA) towards the cash holdings target in...     

Losers and prospectors in the short-term options market

Intraday data for weekly options are investigated for behavioral biases implied in prospect theory (PT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The results generally support both theories, with losers (winners) observed to be relatively risk-seeking (averse). On aggregate, losers (winners) overprice (underprice) their contracts and overweight (underweight) the probability of winning. Additionally, the volatility smirk observed in equity options is dampened by PT/CPT biases. The price distortions are time sensitive, especially for losing traders. Losers hold out by transacting later in the day and closer to expiration than their baseline counterparts. This betting-time effect is absent among winners.     

Traffic evacuation time under nonhomogeneous conditions

During many manmade and natural crises such as terrorist threats, floods, hazardous chemical and gas leaks, emergency personnel need to estimate the time in which people can evacuate from the affected urban area. Knowing an estimated evacuation time for a given crisis, emergency personnel can plan and prepare accordingly with the understanding that the actual evacuation time will take longer. Given the urban area to be evacuated, street widths exiting the area's perimeter, the area's population density, average vehicle occupancy, transport mode share and crawl speed, an estimation of traffic evacuation time can be derived. Peak-hour traffic data collected at three, midblock, Mumbai sites of varying geometric features and traffic composition were used in calibrating a model that estimates peak-hour traffic flow rates. Model validation revealed a correlation coefficient of +0.98 between observed and predicted peak-hour flow rates. A methodology is developed that estimates traffic evacuation time using the model.     

Enhancing Governmentally Sponsored Export Promotions Through Better Segmentation of the Market of a State's Manufacturing Concerns

This article presents methodology for identifying product categories that, if they were made the subjects of a specified state's export promotions, would hold promise for satisfying relevant needs of members of three key “stakeholder” groups regarding the outcomes of the governmentally sponsored export promotions: the World Trade Organization (WTO), managements of non-exporting, small- and- medium-sized (SME) manufacturing concerns, and governmental entities who are responsible for raising funds to support such promotions. Methodology is applied in the context of a state in the United States (North Carolina).

The methodology is then applied in the context of a state in the United States (North Carolina). The presentations of the results of the application of the methodology at each of the 2-, 4- and 6-digit HS-coded product category levels are in each case followed by discussions of implications of the results.     

Dominant markets,staggered openings,and price discovery

This study examines information incorporation and price discovery in closely related markets that witness staggered openings. A theoretical model is presented. In this framework, one market, termed dominant, is the venue where most of the price discovery occurs, and the other is termed secondary. The model predicts heightened volatility and order flow in each market when it opens first compared with when it opens second. The effects are predicted to be more pronounced in the dominant market, and is linked to the process of information incorporation. Tests conducted using futures on crude oil (dominant) and gasoline (secondary), two related markets that witness staggered openings, reveal findings consistent with the model's predictions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark     

Bargaining with revoking costs

A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the other?s offer. While both parties sticking to their offers leads to an impasse, accepting a lower share than the original demand is costly for each party. The set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the game is characterized for continuously differentiable payoff and cost functions, strictly increasing in the pie share and the amount conceded, respectively. Higher cost functions are shown to improve bargaining power. The limit equilibrium prediction of the model, as the cost functions are made arbitrarily high, selects a unique equilibrium in the Nash Demand Game that corresponds to a Proportional Bargaining Solution of Kalai (1977).