Information Inertia

We show that aversion to risk and ambiguity leads to information inertia when investors process public news about assets. Optimal portfolios do not always depend on news that is worse than expected; hence, the equilibrium stock price does not reflect this bad news. This informational inefficiency is more severe when there is more risk and ambiguity but disappears when investors are risk‐neutral or the news is about idiosyncratic risk. Information inertia leads to news momentum (e.g., after earnings announcements) and is consistent with low household trading activity. An ambiguity premium helps explain the macro and earnings announcement premium.     

The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts,Conservatism, and Earnings Management

We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.     

The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next‐to‐Last Resort?

The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a large cooperatively owned government‐sponsored liquidity facility that lends predominately to U.S. depository institutions. This paper documents the significant role played by the FHLB System at the outset of the recent financial crisis and provides evidence on the uses of FHLB funding by member banks and thrifts during that time. We then compare lending activity by the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve during 2007 and 2008, discuss the types of institutions seeking government‐sponsored liquidity at various times, and identify the trade‐offs faced by borrowers eligible to tap liquidity from both facilities.     

Targeting Financial Management Training at Low‐Income Audiences

While interest in financial management training programs for low‐income persons has grown in recent years, the specific training needs of low‐income consumers have not been well articulated. This article describes needed training content for such audiences, based on review of previous research and the authors’ experiences in evaluating the Financial Links for Low‐Income People (FLLIP) program. We also illustrate how the choice of financial management training models can seriously impact the subgroups of the low‐income population who attend training, as well as the success of programs in recruiting and graduating participants. The implications of these findings both for financial management curriculum development and for the selection of program models are presented.