Collusion Proof Transfer Payment Schemes with Multiple Agents

Most of the current studies on transfer pricing under asymmetric information focus on a single principal and a single agent. Under a separating management and ownership assumption, transfer pricing is at minimum a three-person problem involving one principal and two agents. This paper considers a transfer pricing problem with two agents who possess private information and seek to maximize their net cash flows, instead of divisional accounting profits. The objectives of this paper are: (1) to derive a direct-revelation mechanism that induces truth telling and efficient allocation; (2) to study the agents' collusion behaviors under the direct-revelation mechanism. The findings indicate that when agents have the option to quit after contracting, it is optimal for the center to produce less than the first-best output level unless the costs for both divisions are at their lowest levels. The optimal amount of underproduction varies according to the demand condition. In addition, two sets of transfer functions, named as identical and nonidentical functions, are derived to induce truth-telling and yield optimal equilibrium output. The two sets of transfer functions are subject to collusion. However, the functions induce different collusion behaviors among agents, that is, the collusion sets for both functions are not common sets. This property enables us to eliminate any collusion between agents, particularly prior to their observation of private information.     

The Impact of IFRS Convergence on the Effectiveness of Accounting Information for Share Valuation: Evidence from the Mainland of China

This study examines whether the reconciliation amounts between IFRS and PRC GAAP provide additional incremental value-relevant information. More specifically, it investigates whether firms applying IFRS experience an increase in the quality of accounting information in the post-IFRS convergence period. Results show that IFRS convergence increases the values of balance-sheet items and enlarges variation across firms. Moreover, there is no difference in the explanatory power of value relevance of accounting information under IFRS and PRC GAAP for share prices and returns of A-shares. The incremental value relevance analysis suggests that the IFRS adjustments to earnings are value relevant, whereas the adjustments to book values are not. The IFRS adjustments to change in inventory are value relevant for predicting future operating cash flows. Finally, accounting quality improved in post-convergence period. These results are robust after controlling for the unique characteristics of Chinese firms.