The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation

We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held loans are 26–36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2–5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have 9% lower post-modification default rates (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans. We also provide evidence supporting the affordability focus of recent policy actions, such as the Home Affordability Modification Program.     

Stability of M2 money demand function in industrial countries

In this article, we set out a model of labour productivity which distinguishes between shocks which change productivity permanently and shocks which have transient affects on productivity. We show that this model is a type of unobserved components model – a random walk with drift plus noise model. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a coherent framework to identify the deterministic trend growth component and also the productivity enhancing (or technology related) stochastic components. The model is applied to aggregate labour productivity in Australia and the time series of technology shocks extracted is used to shed some light on the contributions of policy reforms to productivity.     

An empirical analysis of home equity loan and line performance

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.     

Impact of State Exemption Laws on Small Business Bankruptcy Decision

To provide further insights into the current debate on consumer bankruptcy, this article empirically assesses the impact of state bankruptcy exemption levels on the likelihood of small business owners filing for bankruptcy. We estimate a proportional hazard model of small business bankruptcy using a unique panel data set of over 43,000 small business credit card holders over a two-year period from May 2000 to May 2002. Overall, our results indicate that for every $10,000 increase in a state's homestead exemptions, the risk of small business bankruptcy increases by 8%. Moreover, we also find that the likelihood of small business owners filing for bankruptcy will rise by 4% with a $1000 increase in personal property exemption levels.     

Subprime Refinancing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination

This article examines the choice of borrowers to extract wealth from housing in the high-cost (subprime) segment of the mortgage market and assesses the prepayment and default performance of these cash-out refinance loans relative to the rate of refinance loans. Consistent with survey evidence, the propensity to extract equity is sensitive to the relative interest rates of other forms of consumer debt. After the loan is originated, our results indicate that cash-out refinances perform differently from non–cash-out refinances. For example, cash-outs are less likely to default or prepay, and the termination of cash-outs is more sensitive to changing interest rates and house prices.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti-predatory Lending Laws: Better Loans and Better Borrowers?

Mounting foreclosures and disclosures of abusive lending practices led many states to adopt new anti-predatory lending (APL) laws. Researchers have examined the impact of such laws on credit flows and the cost of credit. This research extends the literature by examining whether the market responded to these laws by substituting different mortgage products for those restricted by APL provisions. The evidence indicates that the laws were effective in restricting loans with targeted characteristics, and that the market substituted other product types to maintain access to credit and affordability in the face of these restrictions. The laws reduced the involvement of investor and second home purchases but appeared to impact borrower credit scores or down payments.     

Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default?

This article focuses on the potential externalities associated with subprime mortgage origination activity. Specifically, we examine whether negative spillover effects from subprime mortgage originations result in higher default rates in the surrounding area. Our empirical analysis controls for loan characteristics, house price changes and alternative loan products. Our results indicate that, after controlling for these characteristics, the concentration of subprime lending in a neighborhood does not lead to greater default risks for surrounding borrowers. However, we do find that more aggressive mortgage products (such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages and low/no‐documentation loans) had significant negative spillovers on other borrowers. Stated differently, the aggressive alternative mortgage designs were more toxic to the housing and mortgage market than previously believed.