Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand

This paper shows that the cost as well as the effectiveness of technology has a differential impact on technology adoption under two alternative modes of competition. If the cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the effectiveness of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the technology is low, Cournot competition fares better than Bertrand competition in terms of technology adoption by firms. This demonstrates that the commonly subscribed assumption of ‘positive primary outputs’ restricts (inflates) the scope of higher degree of technology adoption under Bertrand (Cournot) competition. Moreover, in contrast to standard welfare ranking, it shows that Cournot competition leads to higher social welfare than Bertrand competition under certain situations.     

Advertising to a social network

Direct advertising—sending promotional messages to individual customers—is increasingly used by marketers as a result of the recent improvements in consumer reachability. Most current methods to calculate optimal budgets for such advertising campaigns consider customers in isolation and ignore word-of-mouth communication (WOM). When the customer base forms a network (as is the case in telecom or social network databases) ignoring WOM clearly leads to suboptimal advertising budgets. This paper develops a model to help address this challenge. We assume that firms know the network structure formed by customers but do not know (or are not allowed to use) data on individuals’ connections. Under this scenario, we compare the optimal campaign of a monopolist to that of firms competing in simultaneous-move or sequential-move games. The analysis provides two key insights: (i) we show that ignoring the existence of WOM leads to significant profit loss for firms and this is more so under competition. In particular, knowing the “density” of consumer connections is crucial for the design of optimal campaigns. (ii) Competition in direct advertising exhibits strong first-mover advantages and, even in a simultaneous-move game between identical firms, highly asymmetric outcomes are possible. The paper also explores two extensions. First, we study the nature of the trade-off between increasing network size versus increasing the connectivity between existing network members. Second, we investigate how firms’ advertising activity may endogenously grow the membership base.     

A three layer multi-item production–inventory model for multiple suppliers and retailers

The paper deals with a production inventory model for various types of items where multiple suppliers, a manufacturer and the multiple non-competing retailers are the members of the supply chain. In this model, each supplier supplies only one type of raw material to the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces a finished item by the combination of certain percentage of the various types of raw materials. The manufacturer produces also multi-items and delivers them according to the demand of the different retailers. Finally, an integrated profit of the supply chain is optimized by optimal ordering lot sizes of the raw materials. A numerical example is provided to justify the proposed model.     

Power,policy networks and planning: the involvement of major grocery retailers in the formulation of Planning Policy Guidance Note 6 since 1988

This paper explores a neglected issue in the study of retail strategy and store location by considering the nature of policy networks operating at the interface between retailers and central government. It argues that informal networks, coupled with the economic power of retailers and the legitimization of their activities with reference to the 'consumer interest', have served to provide retailers with an influential avenue through which they can exert power over the nature of the regulatory environment within which they operate. The paper considers the limited extant 'evidence' of the operation of such networks before moving on to outline the results of a case study. The case study reflects on new store development in the UK grocery sector since 1988 as a backdrop to an analysis of the form of policy networks operating at the interface between government departments and retail organizations. It also explores the role of other stakeholders in this process. The existence of a number of such networks is described and their role explored with reference to the involvement of retailers in the formulation and evolution of Planning Policy Guidance Note 6 on retail development.     

Unionization and International Market Share Rivalry: A Paradox

Two exporting firms (domestic and foreign) are considered which are symmetric in all respects except that one is unionized while the other faces a competitive labor market. Under free trade the unionized firm has the lower market share. Paradoxically, in the policy equilibrium, the unionized firm has the larger market share. Consequently, the nation hosting the unionized firm has the higher welfare level.     

Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

A multi-echelon supply chain model for reworkable items in multiple-markets with supply disruption

The objective of this paper is to develop a multi-echelon supply chain model for multiple-markets with different selling seasons. Here, two suppliers are involved to supply the raw materials to the manufacturer where the main supplier may face supply disruption after a random time and the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive than the main supplier. In this article, the manufacturer produces a random proportion of defective items which are reworked after regular production and are sold in a lot to another market just after completion of rework. The retailer sells the finished products in different markets according to seasons. Finally, an integrated expected cost per unit product of the chain is minimized analytically by considering the lot-size ordered as a decision variable. An appropriate numerical example is also provided to justify the proposed model.     

SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX FOR INDIA

This paper provides the latest Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the year 2003–2004 for the Indian economy with a wide variety of disaggregation for the Energy sector and the sectors that are relevant for environmental and climate policy evaluation. This SAM shows the interaction between production, income, consumption and capital accumulation. It can be used to provide an analysis of the interrelationship between the production structure of an economy and the distribution of incomes and expenditures of different household groups. In addition, it can be used for multiplier analysis to capture direct, indirect and induced impact on input use due to any exogenous changes in the economy. This SAM consists of 85 sectors of the economy, three factors of production and nine categories of occupational households. The Indian economy is becoming structurally biased towards capital intensive sectors, such as service and energy production. The energy production sector itself is the most energy intensive sector as of 2003–2004.