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For decades, the reporting entity concept has been the foundation of differential reporting in Australia. Those entities classified as ‘reporting entities’ are, prima facie, required to produce full GAAP‐based financial reports while other (non‐reporting) entities are generally able to produce less complex and shorter ‘special purpose’ financial reports. In recent years, the application of the concept, as originally set out in the Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) 1 Definition of the Reporting Entity, has been criticized on several grounds—particularly, that it does not yield the reporting outcomes originally intended by regulators. Our analysis of 1,546 companies lodging financial statements with the corporate regulator in Australia (ASIC) shows the principles‐based criteria in SAC 1, designed to indicate the existence of a reporting entity, do not systematically explain its application by entities. Our findings are relevant for policy makers, researchers, and regulators concerned with how these choices might be more effectively regulated in future and whether this is best done through principles‐based or rules‐based approaches.  相似文献   
2.
Recent capital market research evidence suggests that a large proportion of public companies worldwide are characterized by controlling stockholders who are more often families, usually the founder(s) or their descendants. There has been considerable debate on whether “family” firms can indeed be accurately delineated from nonfamily firms given the diversity and abundance of family business definitions in the literature. This paper provides a robust definition of family business for the purposes of capital market research. Using an accounting‐based definition of family business, the paper outlines a four‐step procedure that provides validation for identifying family controlled companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. A significant feature of the research methodology was reliance on data collected from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. Having access to the corporate regulator's restricted data enabled the researchers to establish important links between directors and their private related entities.  相似文献   
3.
We examine the association between board independence and restrictiveness of covenants in U.S. private debt contracts around the global financial crisis (GFC). We show that board independence is associated with less restrictive covenants suggesting lenders willingness to delegate some monitoring of firms with independent boards. More nuanced analysis between the pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods shows mixed results and we suggest that, during the GFC and its aftermath, lenders place more emphasis on ex ante screening relative to ex post monitoring. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence on covenant use and lenders choices in periods of credit rationing.  相似文献   
4.
This paper addresses the paucity of research surrounding the mandatory auditing of for‐profit private and not‐for‐profit companies in Australia. We document the various mandatory auditing provisions under the Corporations Act and identify over 22 000 companies that lodge audited accounts with the regulator under federal law. In 2011, 6339 large proprietary companies, 186 small proprietary companies, 2797 foreign‐owned companies, 3985 unlisted public companies and 8404 public companies limited by guarantee had an obligation under the Corporations Act to lodge audited accounts. While large proprietary and foreign‐owned companies have an option to apply to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission for audit relief, we estimate that less than 10% are granted audit exemption. We document that since 1995 an additional 1500 large proprietary companies that should have lodged under the size provisions of the Corporations Act have been granted exemption from doing so (i.e., grandfathered), although these firms appear to be subject to an annual audit even though they do not lodge accounts. We estimate the costs and discuss the potential public interest and firm‐level benefits associated with the mandatory auditing of for‐profit private and not‐for‐profit companies in Australia.  相似文献   
5.
We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.  相似文献   
6.
This paper contributes to the agency theory literature by identifying relations between family control and corporate governance structure. Emerging literature supports the notion that family control creates strong incentives that have potentially competing influences on the manner in, and extent to, which internal corporate governance mechanisms are utilized. A sample of 100 listed companies (evenly divided between family and nonfamily firms) is used to test the hypotheses that corporate governance structures are different between family and nonfamily firms; and that family firms adopt optimal corporate governance structures. This research finds evidence that suggests that family firms utilize substantially different corporate governance structures from nonfamily firms and that these differences lead to performance differentials. Indeed, results suggest that family control creates, rather than negates, agency costs and future research may be well rewarded by pursuing this latter notion further.  相似文献   
7.
We examine the influence of chief financial officer (CFO) tenure and CFO board membership on accounting conservatism among Australian listed companies. The study uses market-based (i.e., timeliness of earnings to news) and accounting-based (i.e., accrual-based loss recognition) measures of conservative accounting. The results show that while longer CFO tenure and CFO board membership increases accounting conservativism, this is not the case when CFOs become entrenched through long board-membership tenure. This entrenchment appears to lead to the use of aggressive accounting practices. Overall, the results indicate that CFO tenure and CFO board membership improve financial-reporting quality by increasing accounting conservatism in organizations, providing evidence of the importance of recognizing these two governance characteristics in policymaking and in regulation.  相似文献   
8.
Since 2010, proprietary companies have had a choice of preparing three types of financial reports that vary in scope. We find that between 2010 and 2015, most proprietary companies in our random sample chose the lowest scope option, with very low quality financial reports. Few adopted the new option provided by AASB 1053 Application of Tiers of Australian Accounting Standards. The characteristics of the firms that adopted each type of report are consistent with the regulator's intention. Our findings should provide a better understanding of how accounting standards impact practice, and should assist regulators to reform private company financial reporting.  相似文献   
9.
Abstract:  We investigate whether family controlled firms use dividends, debt and board structure to exacerbate or mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders in a capital market environment with high investor protection and private benefits of control. Results indicate family controlled firms employ higher dividend payout ratios, higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence compared to non-family firms. This suggests family controlled firms use either dividends or debt as a substitute for independent directors. We also find that dividends and debt are more effective governance mechanisms in mitigating the families' expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth. Independent directors are, in contrast, more effective in controlling owner-manager conflict in non-family firms.  相似文献   
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