Experimental investigation into the role of trust in collusion

Trust has traditionally been regarded as conducive to ethical decision making. However, empirical studies on the relationship between trust and ethical decision making are rare, especially those concerning the negative effects of trust. Therefore, our study aimed to provide empirical evidence in this area. An experiment was designed to investigate whether trusted parties are more likely than non‐trusted parties to enter into a collusion that will have unfair consequences for a third party. The results showed that trusted parties are significantly more likely to collude than are non‐trusted parties. Furthermore, an ancillary analysis revealed the mechanism of trust. First, participants with a stronger need to collude were the most likely to collude in the trust group. Second, experimental and hypothetical settings generated different results, and we suspect that real harm plays a vital role. Overall, we conclude that the absence of trust serves as an impediment to collusion.     

Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption and management forecasts: The impact of enforcement changes

We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.     

Effect of Order of Contribution in a Sequential Public Goods Dilemma

This study examined how order of contribution in a sequential public goods dilemma affected cooperation. Under a sequential protocol of play, players of different levels of efficacy made decisions one after another. We contrasted a High-to-low versus Low-to-high Efficacy order in a nine-person game. Under a High-to-low order, high-efficacy players made decisions in positions 1–3, medium-efficacy players in positions 4–6, and low-efficacy players in positions 7–9. Under a Low-to-high order, the positions of high- and low-efficacy players were reversed. We hypothesized that cooperation rates would be higher in the High-to-low order that high-efficacy players (assigned in early positions), who would likely cooperate, would induce subsequent players to cooperate also. We found the anticipated effect that cooperation rate was higher in the High-to-low than the Low-to-high efficacy order. The efficacy order effect was the most prominent when people perceived that their group was becoming uncooperative. This study illustrates a new type of structural solution to social dilemmas that by systematically assigning people to different sequential positions, a group can be made more or less cooperative.     

Are Men Always Picked Over Women? The Effects of Employment Equity Directives on Selection Decisions

This study replicates and extends previous work by Oppenheimer and Wiesner [1990, Sex discrimination: Who is hired and do employment equity statements make a difference? Proceedings of the 11th Annual Conference of the Administrative Sciences Association of Canada, Personnel and Human Resources Division], and examined the effects of minority qualifications on hiring decisions, the effects of employment equity directives when minority candidates are less qualified and the effects of different types and strengths of employment equity directives on hiring decisions. The results indicate that when employment equity is in place, people are increasingly more likely to hire underrepresented group members, to the extent that they are more qualified. Men appear to be treated in a positively biased manner, and are more likely to be hired when they are less qualified. Women are less likely to be hired when they are under-qualified, and in the absence of employment equity directives or when there is a suggestion that women are underrepresented. Moreover, when␣employment equity directives are strengthened, there appears to be a subtle backlash for women but not for men. Eddy S. Ng is an assistant professor at Trent University. He was on faculty at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona in 2006–2007. Willi H. Wiesner is an associate professor at the DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University.     

Does corruption increase emerging market bond spreads?

We study the relationship between corruption and borrowing costs for governments and firms in emerging markets. Combining data on bonds traded in the global market with survey data on corruption compiled by Transparency International, we show that countries that are perceived as more corrupt must pay a higher risk premium when issuing bonds. The global bond market ascribes a significant cost to corruption: an improvement in the corruption score from the level of Lithuania to that of the Czech Republic lowers the bond spread by about one-fifth. This is true even after controlling for macroeconomic effects that are correlated with corruption. We find little evidence that investors became more sensitive to corruption in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.     

Firm Size and Performance of Manufacturing Enterprises in P.R. China: The Case of Shanghai's Manufacturing Industries

This paper studies the relationship between firm size and technical efficiency of manufacturing enterprises in Shanghai's manufacturing sector from 1989 to 1992. Although our empirical results show that technical efficiency is increasing in the firm size, the group of the smallest enterprises (0–99 workers) have very high technical efficiency. The group of enterprises with size of 100–249.9 workers have the lowest technical efficiency while the largest size (1000 workers or above) group usually have the highest technical efficiency. Finally, technical efficiency computed from net industrial product has large upward biases compared with that computed from gross industrial product.     

Are Unrealistic Assumptions/Simplifications Acceptable? Some Methodological Issues in Economics

Are unrealistic assumptions acceptable? If results are not changed in a misleading way, they are acceptable. The same assumption may be acceptable in one context and not in another. Assuming identical pairs of individuals in the parity and limit theorems in general equilibrium theory is acceptable as results are not changed substantially. The alleged equivalence of the first‐price and second‐price auctions is based on misleading assumptions; Coase's case against taxing pollution is based on a misleading all‐or‐nothing comparison. The contrasting results (neutrality versus non‐neutrality of money) of perfect versus imperfect competition in macroeconomics with important real‐world policy relevance are also used to illustrate the point.