The Beauty Contest and Short‐Term Trading

Short‐termism need not breed informational price inefficiency even when generating beauty contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two‐period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk‐averse, privately informed, short‐term investors and find that prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in “retrospective” learning to reassess inferences (about fundamentals) made during the trading game's early stages. This behavior introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency. We derive implications that explain market anomalies as well as empirical regularities.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.     

Limits of Arbitrage: Theory and Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities Market

“Limits of Arbitrage” theories hypothesize that the marginal investor in a particular asset market is a specialized arbitrageur rather than a diversified representative investor. We examine the mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) market in this light. We show that the risk of homeowner prepayment, which is a wash in the aggregate, is priced in the MBS market. The covariance of prepayment risk with aggregate wealth implies the wrong sign to match the observed prices of prepayment risk. The price of risk is better explained by a kernel based on MBS market‐wide specific risk, consistent with the specialized arbitrageur hypothesis.     

The Credit Ratings Game

The collapse of AAA‐rated structured finance products in 2007 to 2008 has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). We model competition among CRAs with three sources of conflicts: (1) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers' ability to purchase only the most favorable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles. These conflicts create two distortions. First, competition can reduce efficiency, as it facilitates ratings shopping. Second, ratings are more likely to be inflated during booms and when investors are more trusting. We also discuss efficiency‐enhancing regulatory interventions.     

Dynamic CEO Compensation

We study optimal compensation in a dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed‐form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and performance sensitivity of pay vary over time and across firms. The contract can be implemented by escrowing the CEO's pay into a “Dynamic Incentive Account” that comprises cash and the firm's equity. The account features state‐dependent rebalancing to ensure its equity proportion is always sufficient to induce effort, and time‐dependent vesting to deter short‐termism.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.     

Taming Systemically Important Financial Institutions

We model a systemically important financial institution that is too big (or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision, the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a systemic risk authority endowed with special resolution powers, including the control of bankers’ compensation packages during crisis periods.     

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy ( magnitude effect ), and second, it shows that banks' liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy ( Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect ).     

Capital and Labor Reallocation within Firms

We document how a positive shock to investment opportunities at one plant (“treated plant”) spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide the treated plant with resources, the firm's headquarters withdraws capital and labor from other plants, especially plants that are relatively less productive, not part of the firm's core industries, and located far away from headquarters. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm‐wide productivity increases. We do not find evidence of capital or labor spillovers among plants of financially unconstrained firms.     

A q Theory of Internal Capital Markets

We propose a tractable model of dynamic investment, spinoffs, financing, and risk management for a multidivision firm facing costly external finance. Our analysis formalizes the following insights: (i) Within-firm resource allocation is based not only on divisions' productivity, as in winner-picking models, but also their risk; (ii) firms may voluntarily spin off productive divisions to increase liquidity; (iii) diversification can reduce firm value in low-liquidity states, as it increases the spinoff cost and hampers liquidity management; (iv) corporate socialism makes liquidity less valuable; and (v) division investment is determined by the ratio between marginal $$ and marginal value of cash.